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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last twenty years, there have been major changes in
the procedures followed by government departments and
administrative agencies in exercising their delegated powers. This is
true with regard to a wide range of functions, including those that,
according to the traditional classification of functions, have been
labelled adjudicative, administrative, and, even in some cases,
legislative. Institutionally, these changes have been brought about
by courts imposing procedural requirements as a matter of natural
justice or fairness, by legislatures enacting statutory rights to be
heard, and by bureaucracies opening up their proceedings on their
own initiative to allow greater public input. The implications of
these developments are still being debated, but are potentially farreaching, not just in terms of how the state is perceived, but also in
terms of how it will affect the ability of groups and individuals to
influence the exercise of state power when it affects their interests.
This paper will examine two issues that have arisen as a
result of the administrative fairness revolution. The first issue arises
in response to the activist stance that the courts adopted in the late
1960s and 1970s in the exercise of their supervisory powers to
review the procedures followed by administrative bodies exercising
delegated powers. In this period, the courts expanded the scope of
their supervisory powers to include bodies that were not exercising
functions that were narrowly adjudicative and they took a more
activist approach in defining the content of the right to be heard.
This development sparked a revival of academic interest in
administrative law's theoretical underpinnings! One aspect of that
1In

the United States the volume of writing on due process suggests that the revival of

interest was more than minor. The following represents a small sample. HJ.Friendly, "'Some
Kind of Hearing'" (1975) 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267; W. Van Alstyne, "Cracks in 'The New
Property.' Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State" (1977) 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445;
Michelman, "Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process" in Pennock &

Chapman, eds Due Process,Nomos XVIII (New York: NYU Press, 1977); J.L. Mashaw, 'The
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value" (1976) 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28; J.L. Mashaw,
"Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory" (1981) 61 Bos. U. L. Rev.

885; and J.L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1985).
In England the revival of natural justice or fairness provoked little in the way of a

theoretical re-examination of administrative law. Perhaps this is because leading English
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re-examination has focused on the change in the legal form of
procedural fairness review conducted by the courts. The present
approach of the courts has been accurately described as one of
informal activism.2 Under this legal form the courts are vested with
a broad supervisory jurisdiction and exercise great discretionary
authority in determining what procedures must be adhered to by
state power-holders performing a wide range of functions. This
legal form is significantly different from its immediate predecessor,
appropriately characterized as formal inactivism. The courts, under
that form, saw themselves as being vested with a narrow supervisory
jurisdiction, and with relatively little discretion to design the
procedures to be followed by state power-holders exercising judicial
functions s
This shift in the legal form is seen by some, particularly by
those influenced by critical legal studies (hereafter CLS), to pose a
crisis not just for administrative law theory, but for legal liberalism
generally. Once the courts abandon logically formal rationality, they
lose the appearance of neutrality and their decisions can be seen as
political choices. By demonstrating that the distinction between law
and politics cannot be sustained, CLS theorists believe that they can
demonstrate the bankruptcy of legal liberalism which, in their view,

commentators characterized the period of inactivism that preceded cases such as Ridge v.
Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40 as one of "deviation" (J.M. Evans, ed., De Smith's Judicial Review of

Administrative Action, 4th ed. (London: Stevens, 1980) at 164) or as a "break with tradition"
(H.W.R. Vade, Administrative Law, 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) at 458). I am not
suggesting that there have not been serious examinations of administrative law theory, only that

they have not arisen out of, or focused on, procedural fairness issues. For example, see T.
Prosser, 'Towards a Critical Public Law" (1982) 9 J. of Law & Soc. 1.
There was somewhat greater interest in the theoretical implications of these developments
in the Commonwealth. For example, see D.L. Mathieson, "Executive Decisions and Audi
Alteram Parteni"[1974] N.Z.LJ. 277, and G.D.S. Taylor, "Natural Justice-The Modern Synthesis"

(1975) 1 Mon. U. L. Rev. 258. It seems, however, that Canadians, or academics working in
Canada, have been the most active in examining the theoretical ramifications of the revival of
an activist procedural fairness jurisprudence. For example, see D.H. Clark, "Natural Justice:
Substance and Shadow" [1975] Public Law 27; DJ. Mullan, "Fairness: The New Natural
Justice?" (1975) 25 U.T.L.J. 281; M. Loughlin, "Procedural Fairness: A Study of the Crisis in
Administrative Law Theory" (1978) 28 U.T.LJ. 215; R. Macdonald, "A Theory of Procedural

Fairness" (1981) 1 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 3; J. Grey, "The Ideology of Administrative Law"
(1983) 13 Man. LJ. 35; and A.C. Hutchinson, "The Rise and Ruse of Administrative Law"

(1985) 48 Mod. L.R. 293.
2See Loughlin, supra, note 1.
3

See infra, at text accompanying notes 15-24.
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is premised on the viability of this distinction. Furthermore, they
believe that this demonstration will contribute to the popular delegitimation of existing social and institutional arrangements by
showing that the hierarchies and inequalities they embrace and
support are not necessary or natural, but rather are political and,
therefore, contingent constructions, lacking adequate justification.
Ironically, legal liberals welcomed the very shift that critics
identified as crisis-producing. A fairly typical example of the
mainstream response in Canada is that of David Mullan who
advocated the adoption of the "New Natural Justice" on the basis
that it would finally allow the courts to ask the right question: "what
procedural protections, if any, are necessary for this particular
decision-making process? '4 Although Mullan was cognizant of the
potential for a more informal, functionalist jurisprudence to lead to
internal incoherence, lack of predictability, and excessive
interference with the efficient operation of administration, he
expressed confidence in the ability of the courts to develop
5
procedural fairness review in ways that would avoid these dangers.
The fact that for liberal administrative law theorists there
has been no crisis created by the shift to an informal, functionalist
jurisprudence may suggest an unusual capacity on their part to deny
the impoverishment of their own theory. However, it may also
suggest that the CLS critique of legal liberalism in general, and of
procedural fairness review in particular, is less effective than it
might be. In particular, by demonstrating the internal incoherence
of legal doctrine, critics, in my view, mistakenly believe that they
have struck a telling and, indeed, a fatal blow against legal
liberalism. They fail to consider that the internal coherence of the
law may not be as important to the survival of legal liberalism as is
its ability to adapt in ways that maintain a high level of functional
compatibility between the legal system and the social formation as
a whole. The ability of the courts to shift between formal and
informal modes of justification for their decisions, knowing that both

4Mullan, supra, note 1 at 315.
5

Other commentators have been even more enthusiastic about this revival of informal
activism. For example, see J. Grey, "The Duty to Act Fairly after Nicholson" (1980) 25 McGill
LJ.598.
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can be defended as legitimate techniques in the common law
method, may count as a strength of judicial reasoning rather than a
weakness. Demonstrations of the incoherence of legal reasoning
may cause mild embarrassment to members of the legal profession

and legal academe, but not deep shame. Furthermore, to the extent
that this critique is heard and understood outside the profession and
the academe, it is not clear that the public is astonished or appalled
by the revelation that judges do not act according to the dictates of

formal rationality. To the contrary. People are just as likely to
take comfort from the fact that the courts are prepared to find
"just" solutions to the claims that are brought before them, even if
that is achieved at the expense of coherence and consistency.
The elaborate deconstruction of legal doctrine by CLSer's
stands in stark contrast to their failure to develop a social theory of
law and legal change. To the extent that they have a theory at all,
it derives from a simplified Weberian sociology of law. For some,
this lack of interest in social theory stems from their treatment of
law as autonomous from social structure. 6 However, even those

6

Thus, for example, Duncan Kennedy, at least at one time, claimed to have identified a
fundamental contradiction between individualism and altruism in modern legal consciousness
and, perhaps, a fundamental or ontological contradiction between self and society. He
described liberal thought generally, and legal liberalism in particular, as an unsuccessful attempt
to deny or mediate this contradiction. For example, Kennedy traced the persistent tension
between formally rational and substantively rational modes of justification in legal liberalism
to this contradiction. Formally rational law emanated from individualistic impulses while
substantivelyrational law emanated from communitarian ones. The unresolved tension between
individualism and communitarianism in liberalism expresses itself as an unresolved tension
between formal and substantive rationality in liberal legal thought and practice. Because
Kennedy derived the source of conflict and contradiction in law from the human condition, or,
perhaps, from liberal consciousness, he saw no need to examine the political, economic, and
social historical context in which legal developments took place. He made no effort to link the
dominance of a particular mode of legal thought or structure of legal categories at a particular
time with any other developments in the social formation. Presumably, any shifts that might
have taken place were contingent, variations on a theme bounded by the possibilities of the
basic contradiction, but whose specific determinants are random and, perhaps, ultimately
inexplicable. (These themes are most strongly developed in Kennedy's early work. See "Legal
Formality" (1973) 2 . Leg. Stud. 351; "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication" (1976)
89 Harv. L Rev. 1685; and '"he Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries" (1979) 28 Buff. L.
Rev. 205 [hereinafter "Blackstone's Commentaries"]. He has since renounced the "fundamental
contradiction." See P. Gabel & D. Kennedy, "Roll Over Beethoven" (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev.
1 at 14-26.)
Relying on the Kennedy framework, Hutchinson, supra, note 1 at 299-300 makes the broad,
unsubstantiated claim that a "no hearing" rule in procedural fairness cases is linked with
communitarian values while a "full hearing" rule is linked with individualism, and as these
contradictory visions or values compete endlessly, doctrinal determinacy is "contrived, superficial
and ephemeral" and "must give way to deep indeterminacy."
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who treat the law as if it were autonomous from social structure do
not necessarily believe it. Indeed, in Kennedy's case, he recognizes
the failure to develop a social theory of law to be an omission
which he justifies on the basis that "we need to understand far more
than we now do about the content and the internal structure of
legal thought before we can hope to link it in any convincing way
to other aspects of social, political or economic life."7 Thus, even
for those who view the law and society relationship as both
important and problematic, there is a tendency to avoid serious
engagement with that relationship either by deferring consideration
of it, or by making a nodding reference toward an undefined theory
8
of relative autonomy.
Closer attention to these questions is possible and would
enhance the salience and perspicacity of a critical analysis of
Similarly, Frug, in an article that directly addressed the development of administrative law,
argued that we can view legal doctrine as an unsuccessful series of stories designed to legitimate
bureaucracy by "define[ing], distinguish[ing], and render[ing] mutually compatible the subjective
and objective aspects of life." See G.E. Frug, 'Me Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law"
(1984) 97 Harv. L Rev. 1276 at 1287. Frug described a succession of four such stories and
convincingly showed their fit with bodies of legal doctrine. He too, however, never suggested
any linkage between the movement through these legal stories and changes in the role of the
state in the capitalist social formation and corresponding changes in the institutional structures
of the state. Rather, according to Frug, the story was driven by a "dialectic of critique and
response" carried on as much in our own divided consciousness, as it is between defenders and
critics of large-scale bureaucracy. ]bid. at 1281. As a result, Frug does not develop a social
theory of law because he does not see the relationship between law and concrete social
developments as problematic or interesting.
7

"Blackstone's Commentaries," ibid. at 221.

8
Allan Hutchinson's critical analysis of administrative law and scholarship is a particularly
clear example of this later strategy. See Hutchinson, supra, note 1. At times, Hutchinson
suggests there are some dominant political and social forces which place definite, but not
necessarily narrow, limits on law. 'he law is like a dog on a long leash. Although it will
ultimately follow the lead of its political master, it has considerable range of movement." bid.
at 297. However, at other times, he seems to suggest a more pluralist and idealist world in
which competing, disembodied social visions of apparently equal power battle endlessly for the
hearts and minds of common law judges and academic commentators. "The only perceivable
'pattern' is the constant oscillation between competing social visions, albeit fragmentedly
portrayed and partially grasped." Ibid. at 314. Indeed, Hutchinson goes on to attack John
Griffith (The Politics of the Judiciary, 3rd ed. (London: Fontana Press, 1985)) and Patrick
McAuslan ("Administrative Law, Collective Consumption and Judicial Policy" (1983) 46 Mod.
L Rev. 1) because of their support for the view that there is an ideological coherence to
administrative law which reflects the judiciary's commitment to the protection of basic values
and institutions of the existing capitalist social formation. These formulations by Hutchinson
suggest unresolved and unexplored ambiguities over important issues such as the degree of
relative autonomy that the law enjoys and the characteristics of the social formation in which
the law is located.
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predominant legal theory and practice
In particular, an
examination of developments in the form and practice of judicial
review of administrative fairness in the context of the changing role
of the state in a capitalist social formation and the particular
institutional structures developed to facilitate state action will
disclose that in general a high level of functional compatibility has
been maintained between them. Although this paper does not
explore the means by which the articulation of the law with other
practices in the social formation takes place, it will have discharged
one of its burdens if it succeeds in convincing its readers there is
such an articulation worth exploring in more detail.
The second debate addressed by this paper is about
prospects for, and consequences of, the development of
administrative fairness, including, but not limited to, the current
forms and practices of judicial review. To a significant extent,
academic discussion of this issue has focussed on (i) the institutional
capacities of courts to design appropriate procedures for a wide
range of government functions and (ii) the political judgments that
judges bring to bear when balancing competing interests. While
these debates do provide some insight into judicial review, they are,
in my view, too narrowly focussed. First, the debate implicitly
assumes that courts were and are the principal institutional force
behind the development of administrative fairness.
Such an
assumption ignores the substantial role of the legislature and the
bureaucracy itself in opening up the administrative process. Second,
much of the criticism of the courts and the adjudicative paradigm
assumes there is another institution or ordering process that will
fashion more effectively, efficiently, and fairly appropriate
procedures. While that may be true, the focus on the relative
competencies of various institutions often overlooks some more
fundamental constraints on the ability of procedural solutions to
address widespread discontent with the welfare state.
9
This weakness in the CLS approach has been noted by a number of left critics of CLS who
are generally sympathetic to the progressive aspirations of that movement. This essay builds
on that approach. See F. Munger & C. Seron, "Critical Legal Studies versus Critical Legal
Theory: A Comment on Method" (1984) 6 Law and Policy 257; A. Hunt, '"he Theory of
Critical Legal Studies" (1986) 6 Ox. J. of Leg. Studies 1; and W. Holt, "Recovery by the Worker
Who Quits: A Comparison of the Mainstream, Legal Realist, and Critical Legal Studies
Approaches to a Problem of Nineteenth Century Contract Law" [1986] Wisc. L. Rev. 677. Also

see D.F. Brosnan, "Serious But Not Critical" (1987) 60 So. Cal. L. Rev. 259.
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By viewing the development of administrative fairness as a
response to crisis tendencies in capitalist social formation and the
changing role of the state in that formation, it will be possible to
explore its implications more fully. From a functionalist perspective,
we want to ask whether administrative fairness, including the
practice of judicial review, can serve as a source of legitimation and
stabilization for a state which is, at times, beleaguered by
contradictory demands that it simultaneously facilitate capitalist
economic development and maintain minimally acceptable levels of
economic, social, and cultural well-being. Will a procedurally fair
hearing make the parties to a dispute more willing to accept the
legitimacy of the state's decision, or is it the substantive outcome
which chiefly determines this? As well, from a more radical
perspective we want to consider the transformative potential of
achieving greater legal rights and opportunities to participate in
administrative decision making. In this regard, we consider the
limited conception of participation embodied in the present
paradigm of administrative fairness and its application to liberal
regulatory programs. In particular, the participatory mechanisms
which are provided typically do not empower directly the purported
beneficiaries of government programmes so that they are able to
protect themselves. Rather, they must turn to some administrative
body which will hear them and decide what, if anything, is to be
done.10 What are the prospects of transforming the concept of
administrative fairness so that it includes a right of co-determination
and what are the consequences of participating in administrative
proceedings without such rights? Further, there are serious
questions about the extent to which groups which lack independent
power resources can utilize the procedural rights and opportunities
already recognized or provided.
In other words, how does
administrative fairness operate in practice in a social formation
characterized by enormous structural inequalities in the distribution

lOThis thesis is developed at length by Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work (Philadelphia:
Temple U. Press, 1986). Ironically, the state has perhaps gone furthest in this direction in the
area of occupational health and safety regulation, the topic of Noble's book. For example, the
right to refuse unsafe work, which exists both in Canada and the United States, empowers
workers to protect themselves directly. The ability of workers to exercise this legal right
effectively, however, raises further questions about the efficacy of any right to participate which

does not address the underlying unequal distribution of power in our society.
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of wealth and power? Obviously, we cannot answer these questions
satisfactorily in a paper such as this. Again, it is the burden of this
paper to demonstrate the value of asking these questions in their
proper political-economic context and to suggest further paths of
inquiry.
These themes will be developed as follows. The first part of
this essay describes the major doctrinal shifts in the jurisprudence of
procedural fairness review over the past one hundred years. The
second part links these shifts with developments occurring in the
capitalist social formation and in particular with the changing role of
the state and the institutional forms of state intervention. The third
part examines the potential of the current practice of procedural
review by the courts and, more generally, the current practice of
liberal proceduralism to resolve the crisis tendencies which
undermined earlier models of fairness review and bureaucratic
operations.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The story of the doctrinal development of procedural
fairness in England during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
has been told in numerous books and articles. 1' The situation in
Canada, especially in the nineteenth century, remains largely
unexamined. 2 This paper does not fill that gap in the literature.
For the purpose of this section, the English pattern is treated as
paradigmatic, although developments in contemporary Canadian law
are incorporated into the story. A subsequent section considers
some possible historical differences between Canadian and English

1lSee Evans, ed., supra, note 1 at 158-75; Wade, supra, note 1 at 447-71; and P.P. Craig,
Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 1983) at 253-65.
12

0f course, it is not clear that Canada had a history distinct from England's in this
particular area of the law, but this cannot be presumed. Indeed, for reasons to be discussed
infra, there are reasons to believe that Canada's early development may have been different
from that of England. For a preliminary discussion of issues in the Canadian history of
administrative law, see R.C.B. Risk, "Lawyers, Courts and the Rise of the Regulatory State"
(1984) 9 Dal. W. 31. Of course, recent developments have been documented much more fully.
See hifra.
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developments, but does not reach firm conclusions. Here, we will
only briefly recapitulate the major doctrinal shifts that have occurred
in the judicial regulation of procedural fairness to introduce the
outlines of the legal story that will be examined and to familiarize
the non-specialist with the legal terminology in which the doctrine
is couched. In the subsequent section the adequacy of theories in
respect of the dynamics of legal change in this area will be
evaluated.
Judicial review of procedural fairness is primarily concerned
with the question of when and how individuals and corporations are
entitled to participate in administrative processes that may affect
their interests. While the form of that participation may vary,
typically we are concerned with those situations in which the court
finds that the public authority was under a duty to give notice to
13
affected parties and to provide them with "some kind of hearing
as a condition of the legal exercise of their authority. The precise
content of this duty will not concern us here, although we will
examine the extent of its flexibility.
Traditionally, the telling of the story of the development of
judicial review for procedural fairness in Anglo-Canadian
administrative law begins with brief references to some seventeenth
and eighteenth century cases in which the courts imposed a duty to
act fairly. It then quickly turns to the nineteenth century and
14
focuses on Cooper v. Board of Works for the Wandsworth District.
There the court held that the board in question was under a duty to
hear a property owner before exercising the powers of demolitions
that were conferred upon it by statute. The judges, however,
offered different theories to justify the result. This illustrates that
the law was in a formative period and that no formal criteria existed
which could be used to determine whether or not a duty to hear
was owed. Further, the case suggests that the judges were in an
activist phase in that they were quite prepared to impose procedural

13
The phrase comes from Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) at 557-58, White J., and
was subsequently used as the title of an influential article on the subject by HJ. Friendly,
"'Some Kind of Hearing'," supra, note 1.

14Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863), 14 C.B. (N.S.) 180, 143 E.R. 414
(hereinafter Cooper cited to E.R). For the early history of procedural review see Evans, ed.,
supra, note 1 at 158-62.
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requirements when individual interests were adversely affected by
state action, even though no such requirements were provided for in
the enabling legislation 5
The next chapter of the story opens in the early twentieth
century with the courts beginning to reconsider and then restrict the
scope of the duty to act in a procedurally fair manner, or, to use
the preferred term of the time, the duty to provide natural justice.
The courts began to hold that the requirements of natural justice
only applied to those bodies "having legal authority to determine
questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act
judicially." This was interpreted to deny natural justice to those who
could only point to a privilege that was being withdrawn and to
those whose rights were being affected by an investigatory or
advisory body. As well, the courts held that the duty to act
judicially had to be "super-added," in the sense that it could not be
derived simply from the fact that the body had the duty to
determine the rights of the subject. Rather, the courts frequently
looked to see whether the enabling statute contemplated an
adversarial process.16 This trend continued until mid-century,
reaching its high point in Nakkuda Ali in England and Copithorne in
Canada.1 7 The treatise writers dislike this period, introducing it by
sub-headings9 such as "The Path of Deviation"18 or "The Break With
1
Tradition."
The decision in Ridge v. Baldwin initiated a revival of a
more expansive role for the judiciary in supervising procedures of
administrative bodies. 0 In that case, the court disapproved the
15
"...although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be
heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature." Cooper,
ibid. at 420, Byles J.
16

see R. v. Electricity Commissioners(1923), [1924] 1 KB. 171 at 204-05, Atkin L. See in
particular R. v. Legislative Committee of the ChurchAssembly (1927), [1928] 1 K.B. 411.
17

Nakkuda Ali v. Jayarante(1950), [1951] A.C. 66; CalgaryPower Ltd v. Copithorne,[1959]

S.C.IL 24.
18

Evans, ed., supra, note 1 at 164.

19

Wade, supra, note 1 at 458.

20(1962), [1964] A.C. 40.

566
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doctrinal impediments to judicial review erected over the previous
forty years, and adopted an expansive and open-ended view of the
circumstances which required natural justice.
However, the
significance of the threshold categorization of a function as a
judicial one to qualify for judicial review of procedures remained
somewhat clouded until Parker, C.J.'s judgment in Re H.K, (an
infant), which revived the expansive language of fairness and
expressly attached a duty to act in a procedurally fair manner to
functions not categorized as judicial.21 This expansive fairness
doctrine was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in its
judgment in Nicholson.22
These decisions substantially lowered the threshold one has
to meet to claim entitlement to fair procedures. Recently, the
Supreme Court articulated the threshold test as follows: "This Court
has affirmed that there is, as a general common law principle, a
duty of procedural fairness lying on every public authority making
an administrative decision which is not of a legislative nature and
which affects the rights, privileges or interests of an individual. ,2
Although there is still some uncertainty about the significance of
characterizing a function as judicial or quasi-judicial as opposed to
administrative or legislative,2 4 the overall result of the postNicholson case law has been to extend the boundaries of judicial
review of procedural fairness and to shift the focus of the judicial

21

Re H.K, (an infant) (1966), [1967] 2 Q.B. 617.

22

Re Nicholson and Haldinand-NorfolkRegionalBoardof Commissionersof Police (1978),
88 D.L.R. (3d) 671 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Nicholson].
23Cardinaland Oswald v. Directorof Kent Institution (1985), 24 D.L.IL (4th) 44 (S.C.C.) at
51-52, LeDain J. [hereinafter OswaldJ.
24

Dickson CJ.C., has clearly rejected these distinctions except where they are drawn by
statute. For example, see his judgments in Martineauv. Malsqui Institution DisciplinaryBoard

(No. 2) (1979), 106 D.L.R. (3d) 385 at 410-11 (S.C.C.) (rejecting a categorical distinction
between judicial functions affected by natural justice and administrative functions affected by
fairness) and in Homnex Realty & Development Co. Ltd v. Village of Wyoming (1981), 116 D.L.IL
(3d) 1 at 10-11 (S.C.C.) (rejecting a categorical distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial

functions).

On the other hand, in Oswald, ibid., the court explicitly excluded legislative

functions from the requirements of fairness. Further, some judges have continued to categorize

functions as judicial as opposed to administrative even when there was no statutory requirement
to do so. For example, see Re Taylor and Law Society of British Columbia (1981), 116 D.L.I
(3d) 41 (B.C.S.C.).
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inquiry to the question of what fairness requires in the
circumstances. In answering that question, the courts have generally
adopted a balancing approach which considers a number of factors,
including the interest of the individual at stake, the circumstances in
which the power is being exercised, the impact of the decision, and
the legitimate interests25 of the state in not being burdened with
additional procedures.
III. A SOCIO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF DOCTRINAL
DEVELOPMENTS
Having described the doctrinal shifts that occurred in the law
of procedural fairness review over the last one hundred years, we
next examine the underlying modes of rationality of the law and the
dynamics of the change from one predominant form to another.
This will be done in conjunction with an examination of the crisis
tendencies in the capitalist social formation and the development of
the capitalist state. As a result, the discussion that follows will, on
the one hand, be rather abstract as we use Weber's ideal types as a
way of characterizing different modes of legal rationality, while on
the other hand, it will suggest concrete linkages between the form
and content of legal doctrine and the development of the capitalist
state.
A. Informal Activism: The First Phase
The social formation of mid to late-nineteenth century
England and Canada can best be characterized as liberal-capitalist.
The economic system was capitalist, by which we mean that the
private owners of the means of production (capitalists) hired the
immediate producers (workers) for wages and kept the fruits of the
labour process for sale on the market. The market performed the
function of allocating resources through the principle of "voluntary"
25

These criteria were first articulated in Lazarov v. Secretary of State of Canada, [1973] F.C.
927 (F.C.A.D.), a pre.Nicholson case. The process and criteria resemble those used in England
(Durayappahv. Fernando,[1967] 2 A.C. 337) and in the United States (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424

U.S. 319 (1976)).
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exchange of equivalents between legally equal and autonomous
rights-bearing subjects who, according to liberal ontology, are more
fundamental than, and come prior to, human society and its
institutions and structures.2 6 The idealized role of the state in this
social order was neither to steer the economy nor to legitimate the
social order, but rather to constitute and secure the institutions of
private property and freedom of exchange, and generally to
complement the market which was both self-steering and selflegitimating. This is consistent with the commitment of classical
liberal theorists to limited government and the preservation of a
"private sphere" as the foundation of individual freedom.27
Obviously, neither Canadian nor English society ever fitted
this paradigm perfectly, and it is precisely the contradictions that
bedevilled predominantly liberal-capitalist social formations that are
of most interest in that they provided the occasion for the
emergence of modern administrative law, and the modern law of
procedural fairness review in particular. 28 Even at a very early stage
in its development, the market was unable to allocate resources
efficiently and to consistently generate conditions favourable to
accumulation, and the state began to assist in the performance of
these functions. Indeed, in Canada in particular, the state played an
unusually active role in facilitating accumulation." Reg Whitaker,
following Gad Horwitz, emphasized the impact of the Tory tradition
26

For a recent account of liberal ontology, see A. Arblaster, The Rise andDeclineof Western

Liberalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984) at 15-37.
27

M. Friedman, Capitalismand Freedom (Chicago: U. of Chi. Press, 1962) c. 1.

28This contradiction in the historical development of capitalism is neatly captured by
Polyani's formulation of the "double movement," consisting of the continuous expansion of the
market met by a countermovement aimed at checking its expansion. See K. Polyani, The Great
Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957) at 1130-34. The characterization of the early
nineteenth century as a period of laissez-faire does not, therefore, overlook the fact that the
state was simultaneously expanding. Rather, it is based on the predominance of the market
economy and the classes that supported it. In the words of Derek Fraser, "[t]he onus of proof,
so to speak, was on those who challenged the ideal [of laissez-faire] and claimed it to be
inappropriate." D. Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State (London: Macmillan, 1973)
at 114.
29See L. Panitch, "The Role and Nature of the Canadian State" in L. Panitch, ed., The
CanadianState: PoliticalEconomyandPoliticalPower (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1977) 3 at 1418.
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on the structure, function, and image of the early Canadian state.
However, he also linked the dominance of that tradition to the
imperialist-mercantilist objectives of the British architects of
colonialism. Britain was instrumental in creating a local bourgeoisie
and a local state structure which could guarantee its colonial
interests. As a result, an unusually close and symbiotic relationship
developed between the bourgeoisie and the state. Consequently,
the laissez-faire liberal vision of the limited state failed to attract the
support of the local bourgeoisie. Whitaker summarized the role of
the Canadian state as follows:
IT]he state offered an instrumentality for facilitating capital accumulation in private
hands, and for carrying out the construction of a vitally necessary infrastructure; for
providing the Hobbesian coercive framework of public order and enforcement of
contract within which capitalist development could alone flourish; and, finally, for
communicating the symbols of imperial legitimacy which reinforced the legitimacy of
unlimited appropriation in a small number of private hands. The basic engine of
development in Canada was to be private enterprise, but it was to be private
enterprise at
0 public expense. That is the unique national feature of our Tory

tradition.3

As well, the market proved not to be entirely selflegitimating and, at times, the dysfunctional consequences of the
accumulation process generated sufficient dissatisfaction and
organized discontent to force the state to empower itself to respond.
During the early part of the nineteenth century, the primary class
conflicts were between independent commodity producers and the
financial and mercantile bourgeoisie. That struggle, however,
centered around the question of responsible government which was
achieved in the 1840s despite the defeat of the rebellion of 1837.
Although there was a substantial increase in the size of the state
bureaucracy in the pre-confederation period, and a rationalization of
its operations, the state was largely concerned with revenue and
resource development, areas more related to accumulation than
legitimation31 The Canadian state only began to assume greater
direct responsibility for legitimation later in the nineteenth century
as a result of conflicts arising out of the industrial revolution.
3vL Whitaker, "Images of the State in Canada" in L Panitch, ed., ibid. at 43. For a more
detailed study of the role of the state in the private development of the economy, see H.V.
Nelles, The Politicsof Development (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974).
31

See J.E. Hodgetts, PioneerPublic Service (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1955).
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However, its activity in this field was (and remains) relatively underdeveloped in comparison with other industrializing countries3 2
Demands for increased involvement by the state in steering
the market and legitimating the social order may generate tensions
because the demands that the state is being called upon to respond
to may be contradictory. First, there may be intra-class conflict over
the direction of state intervention in aid of accumulation. Second,
inter-class conflict sets up potential contradictions between reform
in the name of legitimation that may impair accumulation, and state
action in the name of accumulation that may intensify popular
dissatisfaction. The question of how the state resolves those
contradictory pressures requires separate analysis.33 Regardless of
the particular outcome, however, state intervention, in the name of
either accumulation or legitimation, which interferes with the
ontologically posited rights and freedoms of the individual may be
difficult to legitimate from within classic liberal ideology.
Furthermore, to the extent that ideology is embedded in
constitutional or legal doctrines which can be invoked to control or
limit state intervention, the legality of such actions may become
problematic. Judicial review of procedural fairness provided an
avenue for challenging the legality of state action, and for mediating
the tensions arising between the ideology and practice of historically
evolving liberal capitalist social formations.
Assuming that Cooper's case is paradigmatic of the Anglo-Canadian judicial approach to procedural fairness review in the midnineteenth century,3 4 we can conclude that the law in this area
exhibited a relatively low level of norm generality and
32

See Panitch, supra, note 29 at 18-23.

33

For example, the state may empower itself but then not exercise its power, or it may
exercise its power selectively so as to minimize its impact on the accumulation process,
Symbolic legislation is a widely noted phenomenon. See generally, MJ. Edelman, The Symbolic
Uses of Politics (Urbana: U. of Ill. Press, 1985). For analyses of the exercise of state power
in the area of occupational health and safety that explore this theme see Curran, "Symbolic
Solutions For Deadly Dilemmas: An Analysis of Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Legislation" (1984) 14 Int'l. J. of Health Services 5; and E. Tucker, "Making the Workplace Safe

in Capitalism:

The Enactment and Enforcement of Factory Legislation in Ontario"

[forthcoming, (1988) 21 Labour/Le Travail].
34

For reasons to be discussed infra, it is not at all clear that Cooper can be considered

paradigmatic of mid- to late-nineteenth century Canadian jurisprudence.
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differentiation, or to put it in Weberian terminology, it tended
towards substantive irrationality25 On the dimension of norm
generality, the relative lack of legal rationality springs from the fact
that in order for courts to determine whether there was a duty to
act fairly and, therefore, whether they had jurisdiction to supervise
the procedures of the body, they could not mechanically apply preexisting, unambiguous rules. Instead, judges appealed to principles
whose application required individualized assessments of a number
of circumstances. Indeed, as noted earlier, it appears that the ambit
of the applicable rules or the relevant circumstances were not
settled at the time the case arose. For example, the judges in
Cooper could not agree amongst themselves whether the procedural
requirements of natural justice only attached to judicial or quasijudicial functions, or whether the role of the court was to give
effect to the express intention of the legislature 6
In terms of norm differentiation, the justification offered for
the judicial imposition of common law procedural standards was, in
part, formal, but the difficulties inherent in that project brought
substantive arguments to the surface, or at least very close to the
surface. For example, Willes, J. formally justified the finding of a
duty to hear on the ground that the court was merely giving effect
to the intent of the legislature as manifested in the words of the
statute3 7 Yet he began his judgment with an appeal to broad
principle: "I apprehend that a tribunal which is by law invested with
power to affect the property of one of her Majesty's subjects is
bound to give such subject an opportunity of being heard before it
proceeds; and that that rule is of universal application, and founded

35

M. Rheinstein, ed., Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (Cambridge: Harvard U.
Press, 1966). Also see R. Bendix, Max Weber (New York: Doubleday, 1962) c. 12 and D.M.
Trubek, "Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism" [1972] Wise. L. Rev. 720 at 727-31.
36Erie, CJ., expressly rejected the proposition that the duty to hear only applied to judicial
functions, supra, note 14 at 418, and justified the imposition of the duty to hear both on the
basis of "the decided cases and by a due consideration for the public interest" (at 417). Willes,
J., on the other hand emphasized that the powers exercised by the board were judicial (at 418)
and that the legislature had intended that a hearing was to be held prior to the exercise of
those powers (at 419).
37

1bid. at 419, Willes J.
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upon the plainest principles of justice."38 Similarly, Byles, J. justified
the imposition of a duty to hear on the basis that "the justice of the
common law will supply the omission of the legislature, 39 while
Erle, C.J. justified the court's action on the basis of "the decided
cases" and "by a due consideration for the public interest."40
Clearly, Byles and Erie, JJ. maintained a formal element in their
judgments by appealing to the decided cases and by specifying that
the justice being applied was the justice of the common law.
However, their appeals to more general principles of justification
suggest the difficulty they experienced in couching their judgments
in a purely formal style. Substantive justifications, most strongly
rooted in laissez-faire ideology, and partially, but not perfectly
embedded in the common law, were raised to defend the result.
Indeed, we can view the case as part of a project to embed the
premises of laissez-faire capitalism into the common law.
The function served by this jurisprudence in England was
quite clear. It defended and promoted the ideology and practice of
laissez-faire capitalism against forms of state regulation. It did so by
defining a sphere of private entitlements that the state could not
impair without, at the very least, first giving notice to, and then
hearing the private right holder. In Cooper, it was of the utmost
importance that a private property interest was being adversely
affected by state action. 41
Implied procedural fairness review was not the only
technique employed by the English courts to restrict the scope of
state activity. Indeed, it probably was not even the most important
one. The courts were also vested with the authority to interpret
statutes, and they regularly employed restrictive interpretive premises
to limit the substantive powers of administrative bodies and, in
particular, local governments. For example, the courts narrowly

38

1bid. at 418.

39

bid. at 420.

40

1bid.

41

Erle and Willes, JJ., both expressly refer to the principle that "no man shall be deprived
of his property without an opportunity of being heard." Ibid. at 418.
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interpreted the grant of statutory powers to local authorities to
42
regulate the construction of new buildings.
I should emphasize that I am not asserting that the function

of the law of procedural fairness review during this period was
structurally determined or, for that matter, that the function

performed by the law was necessarily more compatible with the
social formation than a law which was less interventionist. With
respect to the first point, we do not have an adequate account of
the reasons why the court chose to defend the ideology and practice
of laissez-faire capitalism against state interventions. It is not
sufficient to show that during this period, not only was the market
the principal steering mechanism of the economy, it was also a
major source of legitimating principles for other sub-systems,
including the legal system.43 Although law, and the state generally,
were supplemental and subordinate to the market, we still need to
examine specifically the extent of that subordination and the
mechanisms for its achievement. In this regard, we must also be
sensitive to those factors which promote judicial autonomy and
prevent the full subordination of the legal system to other subsystems in the social formation. To the extent that laissez-faire
principles were embedded in the law, was this a function of the

42

For a description of the statutory powers conferred on local governments in this regard,
and judicial interpretations of the scope of those powers, see W.C. Glen, The Law Relating to
Public Health and Local Government, 6th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1872) at 218-30. In the
area of housing, Ivor Jennings argued for a somewhat different periodization. According to
Jennings, the courts only began restrictively interpreting local government powers with respect
to housing in the 1920s. See I. Jennings, "Courts and Administrative Law - The Experience
of English Housing Legislation" (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 426. For a recent overview of the
development of legal controls over local government, see M.F. Loughlin, "Administrative Law,
Local Government and the Courts" in M.F. Loughlin et al., eds Halfa Century of Municipal
Decline 1935-1985 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985) at 121-43.
More generally, see R.B. Stevens, Law and Politics:The House of Lords as a JudicialBody
1800-1976 (Chapel Hill, U. of N.C. Press, 1978) at 161, where, after recounting a number of
instances in which the House of Lords narrowly construed legislation affecting private property
interests, he notes that "[I]n these years (1844-1912 ed.), there was little doubt that where the
state was involved, laissez-faire attitudes led to a strong presumption in favour of protecting
private property rights, particularly the right to property." (fn. omitted).
43See generally J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1975) at 18-24. For a good exposition and critique of Habermas's views on law see, C.
Summer, "Law, Legitimation and the Advanced Capitalist State: The Jurisprudence and Social
Theory of Jurgen Habermas" in D. Sugarman, ed., Legality, Ideology and the State (London:
Academic Press, 1983) at 119.
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class background and education of the judges? 44 Did the legal
forms of action and theories that were initially invoked to support
informal activism shape its practice in any way? 45 As to the
question of functional compatibility, can we unproblematically specify
the functionally optimal legal response given the contradictions that
generated pressure for the expansion of state power, including the
power of local government authorities? 46 However, even if we
cannot present a full explanation of the court's behaviour, or
demonstrate that it was the optimal response for the preservation of
a capitalist social order, it was nevertheless the case that the courts
provided a legal framework highly compatible with, and supportive
of, the institutional arrangements and social relations in a
predominantly laissez-faire capitalist social formation.
Having argued that the form and content of the law of
procedural review in the late nineteenth century was functionally
compatible with the classic liberal-capitalist social formation and that
it could be and was sufficiently justified by appeals to substantive
notions of justice rooted in laissez-faire ideology, it becomes
necessary to explain why the law changed in the early decades of
the twentieth century.
Loughlin argued that the shift to inactive formalism took
place as a result of the court's effort to preserve the integrity of the

44For example, one way that Max Weber explained the compatibility of English common
law with capitalist development was on the basis that "[Ilegal training has primarily been in the
hands of the lawyers from among whom the judges are recruited, i.e., in the hands of a group
which is active in the service of propertied, and particularly capitalistic, private interests and
which has to gain its livelihood from them." Rheinstein, supra, note 35 at 318. Also see M.
Horwitz, 77Te TransformationofAmerican Law 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1977)

for a similar explanation for the development of American common law.
45

in this sense the evolution of the law might be thought of as analogous to the evolution

of the panda's thumb. Selection processes and pressures operate on existing characteristics and

therefore do not necessarily produce optimal adaptations, but merely workable ones. See S.J.
Gould, The Panda'sThumb (New York: Norton, 1980) c. 1. The same point was also made
by E. Blankenburg, 'The Poverty of Evolutionism: A Critique of Teubner's Case For 'Reflexive
Law'" (1984) 18 Law & Soc. Rev. 273 at 284 ("[Ihe selection of satisfactory (not necessarily
'optimal') regulatory modes appear to be the pattern.").
6

4 For an earlier discussion of this problem in the context of employers' liability law, see
E. Tucker, "The Law of Employers' Liability in Ontario 1861-1900: The Search for a Theory"
(1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L.J. 213 at 271-75. For discussion of the development of English local
government, see KB. Smellie,A Historyof Local Government (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1968).
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judicial process. 47 This was necessary because continued activism
would have implicated the courts in the selection of policy, and this
would have been inconsistent with the limited role envisaged for the
courts under the traditional tripartite division of powers between the
legislature, the executive, and the courts. Underlying this analysis is
an implicit assumption that the substantively (ir)rational model of
law represented by Cooper is inconsistent with the foundations of
legal legitimacy in liberal-democratic states, and that its appearance
generates crisis tendencies in the law.
This account of the crisis tendencies inherent in the legal
form typified by Cooper, and its resolution by the courts, seems
inadequate on at least two grounds.
First, it embraces an
excessively narrow and a priori view of the bases of legal legitimacy
in a modem legal order which underestimates the significance of
outcomes.48 Second, it locates the crisis and its causes inside the
legal system with little regard to developments in the social
formation, broadly conceived. What is missing is a recognition of
the complexity and contradiction in the legal order,49 and its relation
to the other components of the social formation.
The claim that the legitimacy of the modem legal order, and
its ability to legitimate domination, is overwhelmingly determined by
the extent to which it operates according to the dictates of logically
formal rationality, seems greatly exaggerated 50 Although this view
is firmly grounded in Weberian sociology of law, in my view, it
reflects one of its weaknesses. As Cotterrell has noted, formal legal
rationality tends to take on a life of its own in Weber's sociology of
law. As a result, this approach obscures the normative dimensions
inherent in any system of rules and the importance of those for the

47Supra, note 1 at 220.
48

For a similar critique directed at CLS, see generally Hunt, supra, note 9 at 36.

49

D. Trubek, "Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order
Balbus and the
Challenge of Critical Social Thought About Law" (1977) 11 Law & Soc. Rev. 529.
50

he claim that law in any form legitimates domination has been subject to serious
criticism. See A. Hyde, "TeConcept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law" [1983] Wisc.
L. Rev. 379. My argument is that in some circumstances, but not all, legality plays an
important, but not necessarily successful legitimating function, and that no single form of
legality is uniquely suited to perform that function.
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law.51 The same pattern was also present in the area of employer
liability and occupational health and safety law. The courts applied
the English common law rigidly, but did not strongly resist legislative
change. As well, the legislature left the application of the law in
the courts, through privately initiated damage actions in the case of
employers' liability, and through prosecutions by inspectors in the
case of occupational health and safety laws.52 It was only in the
twentieth century that there was a substantial increase in executive
and administrative authority. As a result of this, and the fact that
the Canadian courts did not undergo a period of instrumentalism in
the nineteenth century, they did not have as much institutional turf
to defend as did their American counterparts.5 3 Indeed, there are
no reported nineteenth century Canadian cases which indicate that
the courts here went through a period of informal activism in which
they imposed procedural requirements to limit the exercise of
delegated state power. s4
With respect to England, the bourgeoisie established their
political dominance through a revolt against the absolutist state.
Laissez-faire liberalism became the established economic policy and
was fully embraced by the judiciary. Indeed, it was perhaps more
fully embraced by the judiciary than by House of Commons which,
by the nineteenth century, was regularly confronted with demands
for state intervention arising out of the dislocations caused by

51

See Benidickson, supra, note 68 at 385-6.

52

See Tucker, supra, note 46.

53

0f course, I do not mean to suggest that Canadian courts never resisted the expansion
of state power. Nor have I overlooked the fact that the courts were able to review legislation
on the basis of whether the enacting legislature had constitutional competence with respect to
the matter. Indeed, at times, the courts used the division of powers to frustrate both federal

and provincial efforts to respond to political and economic crises. Commenting in the 1930s
on recent division of powers cases, F.R. Scott wrote, "It would seem that even without special

mention in the British North America Act, the doctrines of laissez-faire are in practice receiving
ample protection from the courts." F.R. Scott, Essays on the Constitution: Aspects of Canadian
Law and Politics (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1977) at 101.

54The first Canadian citation of Cooper,supra, note 14, that I could find was Tourangeau
v. Township of Sandwich West (1920), 48 O.L.R 306. That case involved an arbitrator appointed
pursuant to the Dog Ta' and Sheep ProtectionAct, hardly a substantial regulatory initiative by

the state. In an earlier Canadian case, R. v. Simpson (1880), 20 N.B.R. 472, the court held that
it only had authority to grant certiorariin relation to judicial acts.
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urbanization and industrialization. The judiciary resisted these
reforms in the later part of the nineteenth century with the tools
that were available to them, including, of course, the power to
impose the requirements of natural justice 55 The decline of English
judicial activism with respect to procedural requirements in the early
twentieth century was, in part, related to the relatively thin
constitutional foundation for their intervention. It also reflected
political changes which had a direct impact on the courts' internal
functioning. Governments were becoming increasingly intolerant of
judicial interference and were increasingly willing to put matters
beyond the purview of the courts.56 As well, the government was
better able to control the House of Lords, the highest appeal court.
According to Stevens, the Liberals became obsessed with the fear
that the courts would interfere with the workings of government
after their attack on trade unions. As a result, they deliberately
57
tried to thwart the development of an activist administrative law.
One step they took was the appointment of Lord Haldane as Lord
Chancellor of Asquith, presumably on the basis that he was
sympathetic to the Liberal's views. According to Stevens, Lord
Haldane selected the panel of law lords who heard Local
Government Board v. Arlidge,5 8 a case which marked a more limited
role for the court in supervising the executive branch of
government. Not surprisingly, the panel consisted of lords who were
or had been active Liberal politicianst 9
Other factors have been suggested to explain the retreat to
formal inactivism. For example, under the nineteenth century law,

55The response of the English courts to early administrative schemes is examined by H.W.
Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in 19th Century England
(Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1984), c. 5, who concludes at page 147: "On balance, while judicial
review did assist various administrative actors from time to time, it tended to be a negative
influence. Decisions were often unsympathetic, even hostile to the new interventionist
philosophy- sometimes they were insensitive to the procedural, evidentiary, and institutional
qualities that distinguished regulatory legislation from criminal law...."
56Stevens, supra, note 42 at 67.
57

1oid. at 198.

58[1915] A.C. 120.
5

91bid.
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informalism at the threshold meant that the categories of interests
that merited protection were open-ended. Individuals with nontraditional interests such as licensees began to come forward
claiming that they were entitled to procedural fairness as a condition
precedent to the exercise of state power. Craig argues that the
"judicial conclusion that the substantive interests at stake were not
worthy of procedural protection."' ° played a significant role in the
development of a formalist jurisprudence limiting the application of
the principles of natural justice.
The point of this brief comparative analysis is not to dispute
that the English and Canadian courts adopted a predominantly
formal inactivist stance in administrative law in the first decades of
the twentieth century.6 1 Nor is it to provide a detailed account of
the process of legal change in a particular country. Rather, the
major point is that we cannot explain these changes primarily on the
basis that substantive rationality was antithetical to legal legitimacy
and that the courts finally realized this. It was not just the
informalist structure of the law itself that was generating tension.
Indeed, if that were the case, informal activism might have been
replaced by formal activism. What was also problematic was the
content and function of the law itself, not that its normative
premises could be thematized in judicial discourse. In the face of
increasing demands that the state play a wider role in facilitating
accumulation and achieving minimally acceptable levels of social
welfare, it was becoming more difficult to defend extensive and
intensive judicial supervision of the procedures followed by public
authorities based on the premises of laissez-faire ideology. That
ideology and practice was on the wane outside of the law; continued
reliance on its premises inside the law was problematic even when
those premises were embedded in formal structures, as was the case
in contract law.62 It was even more problematic in an area of the
law which was substantively rational in its form and therefore
60

Craig, supra, note 11 at 263.

61
It is important to always remember that at any time, the courts may be employing a
patchwork of legal forms and exercising various levels of activism. Generalizations should be,
therefore, carefully qualified.
62

See Atiyah, supra, note 55, who traces the decline of classical contract theory from 1870.
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depended 63
directly on the normative validity of that ideology for its

legitimacy.

B. The Period of Inactive Formalism
Formal rationality became the dominant mode of law in the
area of procedural fairness review in the post-World War I period.
There was a high level of norm generality, insofar as the courts
were able to refer to a few clear rules to determine whether the
body in question was amenable to certiorari, and therefore under a
duty to comply with the requirements of natural justice as a
condition precedent to the valid exercise of its powers. As well,
there was a high level of norm differentiation insofar as the legal
rules were intrinsic to the legal system.
However, the fact that the law was rational in its form does
not mean that it was autonomous. Indeed, in terms of functional
compatibility, formally rational inactivism fitted comfortably with
emerging principles of administrative organization and legitimacy. In
this regard, we might mention two models of bureaucracy that were
becoming increasingly common.64 The first was the democratic
formalist model which envisaged the bureaucracy as the servant of
democratically elected governments. The lines of command flowed
from the electorate to Parliament to the executive, while the lines
of accountability followed back downwards to the people. The
bureaucracy could be conceptualized as the genie that was simply
carrying out the commands and implementing the rules of its
political master. This democratic "transmission belt"65 legitimated
63

"There are, of course, common law standards of reasonableness and some common law
rules purporting to elucidate the requirements of public policy. These, however, bear the deep
imprint of laissez-faire philosophy and are misleading rather than helpful in expounding present
day legislation." JA. Corry, "The Genesis and Nature of Boards" in J. Willis, ed., Canadian

Boards at Work (Toronto: Macmillan, 1941) xvii at xxxv-xxxvi.
64A far more elaborate account of these models can be found in Frug, supra, note 6 at
1297-9, 1318-20.

65"The administrative machinery...is not unlike the machinery which is used in mechanics
to transmit power, from its motor source to the point where it is brought into contact with the

raw material requiring its application." A.A. Berle, "The Expansion of American Administrative
Law" (1917) 30 Harv. L Rev. 430 at 434. Also see RIB. Stewart, "The Reformation of
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the exercise of delegated authority by various officials.66 The
second, and historically latter one, was the expertise model.
Parliament delegated broad power to a quasi-independent body to
regulate in the public interest. Here the legitimating principle was
technocracy. The assumption was there was an overriding public
interest identifiable by non-political experts acting within the realm
of their expertise. Here the administrative apparatus was analogized
to the army. Parliament democratically made the decision to go to
war, but the strategy and tactics of the campaign were not laid out
in advance. "The concrete measures to be taken are largely a
matter of expert judgment, subject to revision 67in the face of
unexpected obstacles and changing circumstances.
Formally rational, inactivist law was functionally compatible
with both these models of bureaucracy. It was compatible with
democratic formalist bureaucracy insofar as it restrictively defined
the role of judicial supervision of procedural requirements to those
situations where the legislature had already imposed "judicial
trappings." In effect, this approach recognized that the choice of
procedure was a political matter. The role of the courts was to
interpret and enforce the law that was properly enacted by the
legislature. It that sense, the courts were also just genies carrying
out the will of their political masters. With respect to the expertise
model, judicial inactivism was functional insofar as it insulated
experts from unwanted external interference. It allowed them to
develop procedural techniques which, in their expert view, would
best facilitate the realization of the public interest. There was no

American Administrative Law" (1975) 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669.
66Thus in Arlidge, supra, note 77 at 136, Lord Shaw stated: "My Lords, how can the
judiciary be blind to the well-known facts applicable not only to the constitution but to the
working of such branches of the executive? The department is represented in Parliament by
its responsible head. On the one hand he manages its affairs with such assistance as the
Treasury sanctions, and on the other he becomes answerable in Parliament for every
departmental act."
67J.4- Corry,supra, note 82 at xxi.
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presumption in favour of adversary adjudication.68 Furthermore, by
restricting its jurisdiction to supervise procedures only to those
bodies required to formally adjudicate disputes between parties, the
courts could claim that they too were acting within a realm in which
they possessed expertise.
The legitimacy of this structure of procedural fairness review
was, in part, dependent on the legitimacy of the bureaucratic models
it serviced. Restricting the supervisory powers of the courts to
situations in which statutes required adversarial adjudication is
legitimate only insofar as the choice of process is seen to be a
question of politics, and not a question of law. In this regard, legal
formality mirrored both bureaucratic formality and bureaucratic
expertise, and the legitimacy of the former was linked to the
legitimacy of the latter. As well, formally rational law was, or at
least had been recently, the predominant form of private law. The
courts could draw upon that private law tradition to defend the
extension of formalism into public law.
Thus to summarize, the shift from substantively (ir)rational
activism to formally rational inactivism is the outcome of a complex
interaction between law, state, and the economy. Structural and
political pressures generated out of the inability of the market
economy to sustain conditions favourable to accumulation and
legitimation led to pressure for expanded state involvement in
steering the economy and maintaining minimally acceptable levels of
social welfare. The expansion of state power necessitated the
growth of bureaucratic apparatuses, which were legitimated both
politically and functionally. An activist law of judicial review of
procedures, substantively rooted in the premises of laissez-faire
capitalism, was a particularly vulnerable structure upon which to
sustain a judicial campaign that could resist these changes or force
them into procedural moulds preferred by the courts. Inactive
formalism was functionally compatible with these changes and could
be easily defended on traditional grounds as well as on the basis of

6

asThe course of proceedings which nine centuries of legal history have elevated to the
position of 'natural justice' in the hearing of the homogeneous class of disputes that are handled
by courts has little, if any, application to any one of the multifarious types of investigation that
are today conducted by administrative tribunals." J. Willis, "Introduction," in Willis, supra, note

82 at 116-17.
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its consistency with the values of the emerging social ordering
69
process.
C. The Re-Emergence of Informal Activism
This leads us to consider the third doctrinal shift described
earlier, the revival of a broad, substantively rational, fairness
doctrine. Under this doctrine, the courts have a broad jurisdiction
to review the procedures of state authorities performing a wide
range of functions. Because of this, no single procedural paradigm
is appropriate for all situations, and the courts must decide what
fairness requires in the circumstances. Once again, the law exhibits
a low level of norm generality and the values that are invoked in
weighing and balancing the competing interests at stake are not
highly differentiated from the values of other sub-systems. Thus
there is a low level of norm differentiation. In short, the decisions
of the courts often look political.
Loughlin identified two reasons for the failure of the formal
inactivist solution: 1) the test as to whether the rules of natural
justice were to apply were not as simple or as rational and objective
as one might at first have believed; and 2) the process of formal
classification led to results in a number of cases that generally were
perceived as having worked injustice.7' The first reason refers to an
internal difficulty in the realization of legal formalism. The courts
could not frame a self-applying definition of a judicial function.
The second points toward a substantive failure, either at the level of
legal justification, of function, or of both. However, Loughlin fails
to capitalize fully on this later insight to explain the shift in the law.
Nor does he consider its implications for the framework he has
been relying upon implicitly. In particular, his recognition that the
practice of formalism eventually led to substantive criticisms of the

69

Note that I am not making the claim that judicial or common law legitimated these
processes. Indeed, quite the opposite. My analysis suggests that these processes were, in large
part, legitimated independently of the law, and that the law drew legitimacy from its functional
compatibility with them, as well as from its own processes and traditions. In turn, legal
affirmation of administrative processes lent them additional legitimacy.

70Loughlin, supra, note 1 at 222 (footnotes omitted).
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court's work undermines his initial assumption about the narrow
range of acceptable justifications for legal action available in the
modern legal order. Formal justifications for legal action, or in this
case, inaction, may not be sufficient to sustain legal legitimacy in the
face of unacceptable outcomes. The ability of the courts to shift to
an alternate mode of rationality may in fact count as a strength of
the liberal legal order insofar as it facilitates the maintenance of a
high level of functional compatibility between the legal system and
other sub-systems.
The importance of examining the relation between what
initially appear as internal legal difficulties and functional demands
to understand the generation and resolution of tensions in the law
is illustrated by examining the relationship between the two reasons
given by Loughlin for the shift in Ridge, something which Loughlin
does not attempt. Let us begin with the problem of formality.
There can be no doubt that it was a difficult task to develop
general rules that possessed a high degree of certainty for
determining what constituted a judicial function.71 However, it
could be done and, to a significant extent, was done, but at a cost.
For example, the tests laid out in Nakkuda Ali and Copithorne
exhibited a high level of generality and certainty. It was not
particularly difficult to determine whether a body was: a) exercising
legal authority; b) determining rather than recommending or
investigating; c) affecting legal rights rather than privileges; or d)
under a duty to act judicially; so long as the test was whether the
legislation itself had cloaked the decision maker with judicial
trappings. True, there were still some difficult cases because
administrative arrangements do not always fall neatly within preconceived categories. What was even more unsatisfactory about this
formal legal test, however, was that it failed to attach procedural
requirements to the full range of functions which, according to
many, required them. Indeed, dissatisfaction with this solution was
only partially focused on the limited concept of a judicial function
that it embodied. More fundamentally, there were demands that
the court become involved in supervising the fairness of procedures

71

For a discussion of the characteristics of legal formality, see Kennedy, "Form and

Substance in Private Law Adjudication" and "Legal Formality," supra, note 6.
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used in a broad range of government functions regardless of their
characterization. Because the doctrinal structure of the law required
a threshold characterization of the function as judicial to establish
the jurisdiction of the court to supervise procedures, the
characterization issue had to bear the brunt of this pressure. The
incoherence of the case law on this distinction was as much a
function of the pressure brought to bear on it because of doubts
about the desirability of making such a distinction at all, as it was a
function of some objective difficulty in drafting rules that captured
an agreed understanding of what constituted a judicial function.
We can illustrate this tension in the development of
Canadian law in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In cases such as
Wiswel172 and Lazarov,73 the courts began to develop a more
functional approach to the categorization problem. They examined
the nature of the interest at stake, the circumstances in which the
power could be exercised, the impact of the action on the interest,
and the needs of the administration in operating effectively.
However, the adoption of this approach made it increasingly
apparent that the label attached to a function was conclusory. The
real question being addressed was whether the court thought that
the body under review arrived at its decision in a procedurally fair
manner, taking into account the factors mentioned above. 74 Once
the courts took this step, they were only one short stride away from
Nicholson and the decline, if not the elimination, of the significance
of the characterization of the function as judicial as opposed to
administrative.
We have linked a crisis of coherence in the internal
structure of formal law to external pressure generated by a demand
for greater judicial supervision of administrative procedure. Next, it
72

Wswell v. Metropolitan Corporationof Greater Winnipeg, [1965] S.C.R. 512 [hereinafter

miswell].
73

Supra, note 25.

74We should note that in some instances the procedural point is probably less important

for the court than the substantive outcome. A court that is unhappy with the regulatory
program may raise procedural hurdles that will clearly impair the ability of its administrators

to achieve its objectives. These concerns can easilybe accommodated by a jurisprudence which
invites the courts to assess the circumstances in which the power can be exercised and the
impact on the interests of citizens and corporations.
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is necessary to develop an account of the development of that
external pressure and its transmission to the legal system. This is
particularly important because earlier we explained the emergence
of formal inactivism, the predominant form of procedural fairness
review, as, at least in part, a response to pressure to create
enhanced state administrative capacities, arising from the experience
of class conflict, social and economic complexity, and external crises.
In seeking to understand why there was pressure for further
change, it will be useful to ask why the bureaucratic responses we
observed fail to resolve the problems of liberal-capitalist social
formations that engendered them.
Obviously, a complete and adequate account of those
processes is beyond the scope of this paper, but we might briefly
suggest some of its principal components. First, there was a steady
increase in the rate of enactment of regulatory statutes throughout
the 1960s and 1970s at the provincial level, and a marked increase
in the rate of enactment of federal regulatory statutes in the 1970s.
As well, there was an even greater growth in the promulgation of
subordinate legislation during this period. 75 The numbers of statutes
and regulations do not, however, tell the whole story. There was
also a change in the scope and subject matter of regulation. With
respect to its scope, regulation moved beyond policing and
complementing limited aspects of private, market-oriented economic
behaviour and took on adjustive and planning functions which
replaced the institution of the market. 76 Further, the subject matter
of regulation also expanded as the dysfunctional consequences of
the accumulation process became more widespread and impinged on
the lives of middle income citizens. The growth of "social" or
"quality" regulation such as environmental and consumer protection

75Responsible Regulation, supra, note 61 at 15-18.
76
For general discussions of these developments, see J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis,
supra, note 43 at 50-55, and C. Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of
Policy Formation" in L Lindberg et al., eds Stress and Contradictionin Modem Capitalism:
PublicPolicy and the Theory of the State (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975) 125 at 12734. For similar observations about these changes in Canada, see R. Schultz, "Regulatory
Agencies and the Dilemmas of Delegation" in O.P. Dwivedi, ed., The Administrative State in

Canada: Essays in Honour of J.E. Hodgett (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1982) 89 at 91-93.
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laws is evidence of this development. 77 The causes of this growth
in the quantity, scope, and subject matter of state regulation are
obviously quite complex. In part, however, we can attribute it to
structural problems of capitalist accumulation and legitimation, and
the inadequacy of the earlier responses to manage these crisis
78
tendencies.
The failure of the formal and expertise models of
bureaucracy to resolve crisis tendencies in advanced capitalism is
related to the inadequacy of these structures in relation to the new
functional tasks imposed on the state. According to Offe, the
formal model of bureaucracy is an unsuitable structure for the
performance of productive state activities.79 This is in part a
function of the problem of overload. 80 The mechanisms for
generating external rules that would govern outcomes could not
keep pace with the demand for their production as the range of
subject matters to be dealt with expanded. As well, the rigidity of
a bureaucracy governed by fixed rules became increasingly
dysfunctional as the complexity and rate of change in the external
environment increased. Furthermore, even if political inputs could
be efficiently fashioned, the mechanisms of political accountability
between the government and Parliament, and between the

77For a discussion of this distinction, see Responsible Regulation, supra, note 61 at 44-45.
78

For an excellent overview of Marxist theories which explore this phenomenon, see M.
Carnoy, The State and PoliticalTheory (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1984).

79"0]0 the extent that bureaucracies are employed as organizational structures dealing with
the performance of productive state activities, they are neither effective nor efficient and hence
produce outcomes that are insufficient in quality and quantity, relative to the functional
requirements of the accumulation process in advanced capitalism." Offe, supra, note 95 at 142.
80

The overload thesis is explored by C. Offe in J. Keane, ed., Contradictionsof the Welfare

State (Cambridge:

MIT Press, 1984) c. 2. Its significance for Canada was emphasized by

Robert C. Stanfield, former leader of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada in "The

Present State of the Legislative Process in Canada: Myths and Realities" in WA.W. Neilsen
& J.C. MacPherson, eds The Legislative Processin Canada: The Need for Reform (Montreal:
Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1978) c. 2.
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government and the civil service, were seen to be less than
adequate81
Formal bureaucracy was also criticized for its inadequacies in
relation to non-productive state functions. Bodies that administered
social assistance and social insurance programs were and are
routinely criticized for adhering to rules which fail to address the
individual needs of claimants. Images of an anonymous bureaucracy
whose rules are unknown to the public and which only allows the
public to have direct contact with powerless clerks with limited
authority2 have been part of our popular culture for most of this
8
century.
Another explanation for the failure of the formal model
develops from its potential implication for the expansion of the
realm of direct political decision making. The argument here is not
that legislative bodies are functionally inadequate in a technical
sense, but rather that the identification of the location of decisionmaking power in a democratically elected body will be functionally
inadequate in a political sense. That is, the capitalist state will fail
to facilitate accumulation because democratically elected legislatures
will prevent it from doing so. Liberals, such as J.S. Mill, s8 and
Marxists84 share the belief there is substantial potential for
incompatibility between mass political democracy and capitalism. In
theory, workers could capture the legislative branch of government
and use the formally rational bureaucracy to extend its control over
the private economy. Even if they did not succeed, the location of
decision-making power in Parliament could intensify the conflict
between the requirements of accumulation and legitimation.
81 Problems of accountability are a dominant theme of the essays in The Administrative
State in Canada,supra, note 95. See particularly J.R, Mallory, "Curtailing 'Divine Right': The
Control of Delegated Legislation in Canada" at 131 and O.P. Dwivedi, "On Holding Public
Servants Accountable" at 151.
82

The classic cultural expression of this image is F. Kafka, 7he Trial,trans. W. Muir (New

York: Vintage, 1969).
-3j.S. Mill, Considerationson Representative Government, (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1975) c.
8.
84See for example, K Marx, ClassStruggles in France1848-1850 (New York: International
Publ., 1964) who explains the demise of universal suffrage in France in 1850 on the basis that
it threatened bourgeois rule.
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We can explain the development of the expert or
substantively rational bureaucratic model, in part, as an attempt to
overcome the problems identified in the formal model. With
respect to the political problem, there are a variety of factors and
strategies which can reduce the tensions between political
democracies and capitalist economies, including the imposition of
constitutional limits on state power. A less drastic alternative is to
shift power to a bureaucracy in such a way that it is no longer
directly dependent on political inputs, nor directly accountable to
the legislature. In other words, by severing the transmission belt, at
least partially, the state can more easily be constrained by dominant
classes.85 With respect to the efficiency problem, the expert model
held out the promise of relieving the bureaucracy of an institutional
dependence on structures that could not respond adequately to the
complex and fluid environment. It would allow the bureaucracy to
engage in problem-solving modes of operation. Discretionary power
could provide the flexibility necessary to achieve substantively
rational results.
However, the expertise model had its own limitations. In
particular, the application of expertise to the resolution of problems
presupposes that the goals of purposive action could be identified
and would remain relatively stable. The belief that we had reached
"the end of ideology"86 and that there was an overriding public
interest identifiable by experts was short-lived. The state was
regularly confronted with a great variety of needs, interests, and
demands which, at best, were only partially, and temporarily
85

The classic Marxist formulation of this thesis is Lenin's: 'Take any parliamentary
country, from America to Switzerland, from France to Britain, Norway and so forth - in these
countries the real business of 'state' is performed behind the scenes and is carried on by the

departments, chancelleries and General Staffs. Parliament is given up to talk for the special
purpose of fooling the common people." V. Lenin, "State and Revolution" (1917) in James E.
Connor, ed., Lenin on Politicsand Revolution: Selected Writings (New York: Pegasus, 1968) 184
at 211. It is interesting to note that although Weberians do not link the decline of
parliamentarianism and the growth of bureaucracy to class conflict (for example, see A. Paul

Pross, "Space, Function and Interest: The Problem of Legitimacy in the Canadian State" in The
Administrative State in Canada,supra, note 95 at 107), Weber himself agreed with Lenin that
in the absence of a strong working parliament, bureaucratic dominance would strengthen the
influence and control of capital over the state. For an interesting comparison of Weber's and
Lenin's views, see E.O. Wright, supra, note 59, c. 4.
86

For a useful collection of some of the important contributions to this debate see C.

xVaxman, ed.,

te End ofIdeology Debate (New York: Simon-Shuster, 1969).
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reconcilable. As a result, the distinction between politics and
administration was becoming increasingly blurred.
Agencies
87
policies.
support
to
bases
political
build
to
needed
themselves
Furthermore, even if there was an identifiable public interest,
numerous commentators expressed doubt about the capacity of
expert, independent administrative agencies to identify and give
effect to that interest. Theories of regulatory failure abounded.
They included original capture,8 agency life cycle,89 elite
accommodation, 9° clientism,91 and the claim that the government
was not appointing experts, but rather its political friends.92 In
more traditional areas of regulation, there was also an attack on the
existence of discretionary power. Why did one claimant receive
supplementary benefits and not another? No rule could be invoked
to explain this difference. It was a matter of 'judgment." 93
Furthermore, if expert agencies fail to achieve common
goals, either because common goals do not exist or because agencies
are unable to identify and implement them, then they cannot fall
back on democratic or legal legitimation principles. Indeed, the de-

87See Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy (New York: Free Press, 1977) at 264.
88

Supra, note 63.

89
M.H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton U. P., 1955). For a review of the literature questioning the applicability of this thesis

to Canada see R1D. Cairns, Rationalesfor Regulation (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada,
Technical Report No. 2, 1980) 18-19. In this regard also see D.A. Townsend, An Examination
of the Life Cycle/Capture Hypothesis and its PotentialApplication to Canadian Independent

RegulatoryAgencies (Master of Laws, Osgoode Hall Law School, 1982) [unpublished].
90

RV. Presthus, Elite Accommodation in CanadianPolitics (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973)

at 211-26.
91

W.D. Coleman, "The Capitalist Class and the State: Changing Roles of Business Interest

Associations" (1986) 20 Studies in Pol. Eco. 135.
92

For an extensive catalogue, see B.M. Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation:
Creating,Designing and Removing Regulatory Forms (New York: Columbia University Press,
1980) c. 3.
93For discussions of the attack on discretion in welfare decision making and its
consequences, see I. McKenna, "The Legalisation of Supplementary Benefits - More Power to

the Claimant?" [1985] Public Law 455 and W.H. Simon, "Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the
Welfare System" (1983) 92 Yale LJ.1198.
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legalization of bureaucracy, once thought functionally necessary, now
undermines the legitimacy of its decisions.
If formally structured administrative agencies are functionally
inadequate because their political inputs are of insufficient quantity
or quality, and if expert agencies are unable to fulfill their function
because there are no technocratic solutions to social and economic
problems, or because of the conversion of private power into state
power, then one solution is to change the procedures followed by
the agency in exercising its powers. The extension of the right to
be heard allows groups affected by agency action, or inaction, the
opportunity to have direct input into agency decisions. Participation
of this sort responds to the defects in the formal model by
supplementing or usurping the traditional, but impaired channels of
political accountability. It responds to defects in the expertise
model either by rejecting it in favour of politics, or, alternatively, by
acting as an antidote to the problem of capture that supposedly
defeated the achievement of the public interest. The "open" agency
model is, on one level, an attempt to improve the output of
regulatory agencies by broadening its inputs. This is also true for
authorities administering social insurance and social assistance
programmes, disciplinary programmes, and immigration programmes,
and who make individual assessments of entitlement and
deservedness.
The emergence of procedural fairness in decision making is
not just explained and defended because of its substantive benefits.
The inability of administrative bodies to manage crisis tendencies
was not just a result of structures that were functionally inadequate.
There is also the problem of legitimation. Formal democratic and
public interest expertise legitimation stories were increasingly read
as fictional accounts of bureaucratic life. Furthermore, the
persistence of dysfunctional outcomes for some groups reduced the
availability of functional legitimation. The decline of political and
functional legitimations left a legitimation deficit that needed to be
addressed. At the same time, constraints limited the alternatives.
According to Mandel, "increasing recourse must be made to forms
of legitimation that are abstract in the sense that they do not
depend on meeting people's concrete needs and that avoid genuine
participatory democracy, even in the public sphere, which in the
context of state involvement in the economy might endanger the
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freedom to accumulate. 94 Procedural fairness could provide,
potentially, a new source of legitimations that met these constraints.
Procedural fairness is also supported from a conservative
political perspective in which state intervention is viewed as an
infringement on individual liberty. Where political support for the
dismantling of some state apparatuses might be weak, or where the
need for state interventions is accepted, procedural fairness is
demanded as a basic requirement for the preservation of individual
rights. Indeed, procedural fairness becomes a necessary, but not
necessarily sufficient, condition for the exercise of necessary or
unshirkable state power. An excellent example of this impetus for
fairness in Canada is The Citizens' Code of Regulatoiy Faness,
issued by the Federal Department of Justice as part of its regulatory
reform strategy. The ideological premises of this exercise are
revealed in the first sentence of the preface to the Code: "When a
government regulates, it limits the freedom of the individual." Not
only does the Code promise to give citizens "a full opportunity for
consultation and participation" in the regulatory process, it also
enshrines the principle that
government will exercise restraint in its
95
use of regulatory powers.
Procedural fairness, however, was not just a response
initiated from above. There were increasing pressures to expand
participation in administrative decision making coming from below.
In the words of Lowi, "every delegation of discretion away from
electorally responsible levels of government to professional career
administrative agencies is a calculated risk because politics will
always flow to the point of discretion; the demand for
representation would take place at the point of discretion"96 This
was true not just of traditional interest groups, but also of the poor,
who, in the aftermath of the Keynesian compromise, saw themselves
as holding legally protected interests in their benefits, and who, in
94

M. Mandel, 'The Legalization of Prison Discipline in Canada" (1986) 26 Crime and

Social Justice 79 at 86.
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The Citizens' Code of Regulatory Fairness, (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1986).
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TJ. Lowi, 'Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power"

(1986) 36 American U. L. Rev. 295 at 297.
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some circumstances, organized to pursue their claims through
political and legal action. 97
Of course, proceduralist solutions were not necessarily the
major goal of these movements. Substantive reforms were also
pursued, and sometimes achieved. However, we need to examine
why substantive goals were often translated into procedural reform.
An obvious possibility is that it was often easier to obtain
procedural rather than substantive reform. If the state was under
pressure to make concessions, it was cheaper to make procedural
concessions than substantive improvements. Further, procedural
reform offered elites an opportunity to reintegrate discontented
groups into more regular institutional channels of political action.
Once the agency doors were opened, it became possible to defend
the legitimacy of administrative decisions by pointing to the
opportunities provided for participation in the decision-making
process. Losers who believed the process was fair might be more
willing to accept the outcome.98
The modern development of
the procedural fairness in bureaucracies is not a simple story, and it
certainly is not just a tale of judicial activism. Some administrative
agencies initiated open processes without much external prompting.
The best known instance of this phenomenon is the Canadian
Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC).99
97

The classic American account of these developments is F. Piven & IL Cloward, Poor

People's Movements: Why They Succeed,How They Fail (New York: Vintage, 1979).
98

Numerous authors have emphasized the legitimation effects of procedural fairness. For

example, see J.O. Freedman, Crisisand Legitimacy: The AdministrativeProcess andAmerican
Government (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge U.P., 1978) c. 10; J.L. Mashaw, "Administrative Due
Process: The Quest For A Dignitary Theory" (1981) 61 Bos. U. L. Rev. 885; and R.S.
Summers, "Evaluating and Improving Legal Process - A Plea for 'Process Values'" (1974) 60
Cornell L. Rev. 1.
Similar arguments have been made in defence of the collective bargaining system. "A
principal objective of the collective bargaining system is to provide workers with a means of
participating, either directly or through their chosen representatives, in the determination of

their terms and conditions of employment. The collective bargaining process becomes a means
of legitimizing and making more acceptable the superior-subordinate nexus inherent in the
employer-employee relationship." Canada, Task Force on Industrial Relation, Canadian

IndustrialRelations (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at 95, para. 291.
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For example, see Law Reform Commission of Canada, Public Participation in the
AdministrativeProcess, by David Fox (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1979) at
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In other cases, the legislature took the initiative, either by enacting
general procedural codes, as in the case of the Statutory Powers
ProcedureAct 1°° in Ontario, or by enacting procedures tailored to fit
the needs of particular statutory authorities.10 1 And, of course,
sometimes procedural requirements were imposed by the courts in
the face of an authority's unwillingness to open up its process,10 2 or
indeed, in the face of an apparent legislative determination, not to
require a more open process.103
While our primary concern is with this revival of judicial
activism in reviewing the procedures followed by public authorities,
it is important to keep in mind this larger context. It suggests that,
to a significant extent, the development of an informal activist
approach was functionally compatible with developments in the
welfare state. The qualified nature of this statement is intentional.
It recognizes that the developments identified here only represent
tendencies in a highly complex and, at times, contradictory process
of adjustment and change within advanced capitalist social
formations. As well, procedural fairness review by the courts has
not developed in a process of unilinear evolution and, at times, the
courts have been in conflict with other branches of the state.
Furthermore, we cannot explain the motivation for increased judicial
intervention simply by pointing to functional and legitimation deficits
in the earlier models of administrative regulation, although some of
the justification for judicial inactivism rested on the credibility of
those regulatory models.
One starting point for an assessment of the particular
motivation for a revival of judicial activism is Loughlin's observation
that there was a perception that injustices were resulting from the
operation of the inactivist formal model of judicial review. For

100

RS.O. 1980, c. 484 [hereinafter the SPPA].
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For example, at the same time that the SPPA was enacted, the Ontario legislature also

amended a multitude of individual statutes by the CivilRightsStatute LawAmendmentAct, 1971,

S.O. 1971, c. 50.
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For example, see Lazarov, supra, note 25.
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example, adherence to formal reasoning at times led the court to
deny procedural protection to holders of traditional private property
interests."° To those judges of a conservative bent, these results
must have seemed both unjust and dysfunctional. Therefore, it was
not surprising that, in at least some cases, formal constraints were
loosened or evaded to provide relief to private property owners
adversely affected by administrative action."s From this perspective,
renewed judicial activism was not a positive response to the sagging
legitimacy of existing regulatory models, but rather an occasion for
the courts to re-assert their traditional conservative agenda, which
had been subordinated, but not erased, during the period of
accommodation 06
However, this explanation is not sufficient to understand the
extension of procedural fairness review into areas of administrative
action that do not touch private property interests, including the
treatment of public employees (especially police),10 recipients 1 of
08 and prisoners. 0 9
various income support and assistance benefits,
Clearly, the courts recognized that in the Keynesian welfare state,
any expression of a commitment to the legal protection of individual
rights had to go beyond the protection of traditional property rights
110
if it was to be credible. Whether thought of as "new property,

104See, for example, Copithorne,supra, note 17.
05

For example, even in the pre-Ridge period, the courts sometimes overcame the formal

hurdles to the imposition of procedural requirements in order to protect property rights. For
example, see Knapman v. Board of Health for Saltfleet Township, [1954] 3 D.L.R. 760 (Ont.

H.C.).
106For a particularly strong affirmation of the procedural rights of private property owners,
see the dissent of Dickson, J. (as he was then) in Homax Realty and Development Co. Ltd v.
Village of Wyoming, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 1011 at 1041.

1071t is interesting to note that both in England and Canada, the landmark procedural
fairness cases both involved claims by police officers. See Ridge, supra, note 20 (England) and
Nicholson, supra, note 22 (Canada). It is no longer contumacious to suggest that the courts
have a special concern for the police, although it may be unprofessional. See R. v. Kopto,
[1987] O.J. No. 1052, CA. No. 969/86 (November 27, 1987) [unreported].
1 08 Re Webb and OntarioHousing Corporation (1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 187 (Ont. CA.).
1 09 Martineauv. Matsqui Institution DisciplinaryBoard (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.RI 602.
11 0 CA. Reich, 'TheNew Property" (1964) 73 Yale Li. 733.
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or simply as rights enhancing the dignity and autonomy of the
individual, liberals on the bench became willing to extend procedural
protections to those rights holders, even if that resulted in the
judicial supervision of the procedures of administrative authorities in
contexts that had traditionally been outside of the courts' purview 11
Thus, in sum, we can see that changes in the social
formation put pressure on the state to expand its capacities.
Existing regulatory models were functionally inadequate and
increasingly losing their legitimacy. As a result, pressure developed
on a formal conceptual distinction erected precisely to avoid a
judicial confrontation with early to mid-twentieth century regulatory
models. Judicial formalism served the function of creating a space
for the development of substantively rational forms of public law
which authorized public officials to exercise substantial discretionary
powers in the pursuit of broadly defined regulatory goals. Once the
legitimacy of those models faltered, so too did the legitimacy of
formal inactivism. Indeed, now the tables are turned. One of the
principal complaints about the welfare state is that it is insufficiently
constrained by the rule of law.11 2 Ironically, this occurred under the
aegis of the legal form most often associated with the triumph of
the rule of law, logically formal rational law. Furthermore, rule of
law supporters now claim that the re-legalization of state power
requires the adoption of a substantively rational approach to the
review of administrative procedures. The success of this strategy,
however, needs to be critically examined.

111

For the view that the modem function of judicial review is the protection of individual
rights against encroachment by the state, and that the behaviour of the judiciary is motivated
by the desire to protect individuals from political and bureaucratic oppression, see Grey, "The
Ideology of Administrative Law," supra, note 1. For a recent discussion of the development
of procedural protections with respect to lesser interests, see R. Baldwin & D. Home,
"Expectations in a Joyless Landscape" (1986) 49 Mod. L. Rev. 685 at 692-702.
112

For example, see F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1944) and T.J. Lowi, The End ofLiberalism: The Second Republic of the United States,

2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1979). For an influential affirmation of the importance of the
rule of law in the control of public authority, see Ontario, Report of the Royal Commission
Inqury Into Civil Rights, Report No. 1, Vol. No. 1 (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1968).
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IV. CRISIS TENDENCIES IN PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND
THEIR CONTAINMENT
In the previous section we inquired into the development of
procedural fairness review by the courts as well as the development
of more participatory models of bureaucratic operations generally.
These developments were seen to be, at least in part, a response to
crisis tendencies in the capitalist social formation which
simultaneously led to the expansion of state functions and limited
the ability of the state to perform those functions and maintain its
legitimacy. In this section, we want to examine briefly the adequacy
of the procedural responses to these crisis tendencies. First, we will
consider three criticisms of the current practice of judicial review of
procedural fairness. Although rooted in different traditions, they all
suggest that even if enhanced hearing rights are desirable, the
courts, employing an informal activist jurisprudence, should not be
the institution having major responsibility for achieving them. Next,
we will consider whether a procedurally fair bureaucracy, however
achieved, can resolve the systemic crisis tendencies that we
observed. As well, from a progressive perspective, we will inquire
into the extent to which procedural fairness creates opportunities
for relatively less powerful groups to enhance their ability to
influence the outcome of administrative processes, or to act directly
to protect themselves.
A. Judicial Review of ProceduralFairness
The ability of the courts to supervise and reform the
procedures followed by state administrators has been criticized on a
number of grounds. Here we will review three: the crisis of
declining formality, the institutional capacity of the courts, and the
politics of the judiciary. Clearly, these criticisms are inter-related,
but it will be useful to examine them separately.
1. Declining formality
We have already dealt with this argument in relation to the
decline of an earlier period of informal activism. Here, then, we
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will only review it in relation to current practice and illustrate the
limited impact that it has had on rule of law adherents s Loughlin
argued that the chief difficulty with the informal activist approach to
fairness review was that informality was inconsistent with the
traditional model of the rule of law. Further, he claimed that that
model provided the foundation for traditional administrative law
theory.
The problem with Loughlin's analysis is that it
overemphasizes the role of rule formality. Rule formality was not,
and is not, the overriding commitment of legal liberals or other
traditional rule of law adherents.
It is true that a core notion of the rule of law is that
everything must be done according to constitutionally valid law. The
conception of law embraced in this model is that of a seamless web
of general rules which indicate, in advance, the legal consequences
of any action 14 Historically, however, the rule of law has stood for
more than just a positive conception of legality. It has embraced
normative and institutional commitments. The most influential
nineteenth century articulation of these commitments is in Dicey's
The Law of the Constitution. There he identifirs "at least three
distinct though kindred conceptions."115 These are: 1) that no one
may be punished except for a distinct breach of the law established
in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts; 2) that no
man is above the law, including all officials, and that every man is
subject to the ordinary law and amenable to the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts; and 3) that the general principles of the
constitution are the result of judicial decisions determining the rights
of private persons in particular cases brought before the courts.
Substantively, these conceptions exhibit a strong commitment to
individual liberty and limited government. Doctrinally, they express
hostility to discretionary power. Institutionally, they express a
113It is interesting that political scientists such as Lowi, who bemoan informalism and the
decline of the rule of law through excessive delegation, see an antidote in judicial activism, but
fail to consider the problem of judicial informality. For example, see Lowi, ibid.
114This definition of the rule of law has been characterized aptly as its "thin version" by

A. Hutchinson & P. Monahan, "Democracy and the Rule of Law," in A. Hutchinson & P.
Monahan, eds The Rule of Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 97 at 101.
115

A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of The Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. by E.C.S.
WVade (London: Macmillan, 1965) at 188-203.
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commitment to the common law courts as the principal guardian of
legality. Indeed, in each of the three conceptions, it is the common
116
law courts that are the linchpin holding the edifice together.
It was in the pursuit of these later commitments that the
courts departed from the model of legal formality to expand its
jurisdiction to subject public authorities to their view of the
requirements of procedural fairness. Indeed, judicial review of the
fairness of the procedures followed by the state in the exercise of
delegated power is now seen by Dicey's followers to be a critically
important component of the rule of law and the protection of
individual liberty against arbitrary state power.117 Thus, although
the change from formal inactivism to informal activism was, in one
sense, a departure from the rule of law, in another sense, the shift
vindicated the rule of law by re-asserting the authority of its
institutional guardian, the courts, to protect individual liberty.
Informality in the law of judicial review is tolerable if it preserves
judicial control. 118
In Canada this defence of the new fairness jurisprudence has
been most clearly articulated by Julius Grey. His support for
judicial review for fairness springs from a fear of the new Leviathan.
In a commentary on Nicholson, Grey started from the premise that
"[i]n the 1960s and 1970s the role of government in everyday life
grew by leaps and bounds. Officials began to hold and exercise
power of a scale hitherto unknown. 1 19 In the face of this ominous
development there was a need for more judicial review. The old

116

The centrality of the ordinary law and the ordinary courts in the Diceycan conception

of the rule of law is emphasized by H.W. Arthurs, "Rethinking Administrative Law. A Slightly
Dicey Business" (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall LJ.1.
117
"Procedure is not a matter of secondary importance. As governmental powers
continually grow more drastic, it is onlybyprocedural fairness that they are rendered tolerable."

Wade, supra, note 1 at 413.
118
The leading contemporary English exponent of this view is Wade, supra, note 1. He is
even more tolerant of judicial creativity in controlling the substance of the exercise of
discretionary powers. Ibid. at 348. The legal theories which support this role for the courts
have been characterized as "red light theories" in C. Harlow & R. Rawlings, Law and
Administration (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984) c. 1.
119

J.H. Grey, "The Duty to Act Fairly After Nicholson" (1980) 25 McGill L. 598

[hereinafter "The Duty"].
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categorization of functions approach was "threatening to cause
hardship and to prevent the courts from administering justice in vital
areas of human endeavour. '1 20 The fairness doctrine had the
potential to overcome these restrictions, but the courts needed to
nurture it. Aside from the importance of obliterating the old
distinctions between quasi-judicial and administrative functions, and
eliminating archaic remedial difficulties, it was, in Grey's view,
particularly important that the courts expand the fairness doctrine 121
to
encompass substantive as well as procedural grounds of review.
Indeed, Grey argued that the basis for a general doctrine of fairness
review was already present in the law, found in the principles
governing judicial review of discretion. The distinction between
substantive and procedural review should, in Grey's view, be
dropped and subsumed under the broader principle of fairness.
Thus for Grey, and for many contemporary rule of law
advocates, the informality of the new fairness jurisprudence is of no
great concern. The functional imperative for expanded judicial
control, the protection of the individual from the state, simply
overwhelms any possible concern about the potentially corrosive
effect of informality on the legitimacy or certainty of the law. In
Grey's view, these losses "would be more than offset by the gain in
122
justice and consequent respect for the law."
The failure of the spectre of informalism to generate a crisis
for legal liberals does not mean that it is irrelevant to the long-term
capacity of the courts to supervise administrative procedure.
Indeed, Loughlin argued that the English courts exhibited a distinct
1 23
reluctance to abandon formal classifications of functions.
According to Macdonald, "As the courts begin to realize the
potential scope of the fairness doctrine they tend to retreat from a

120

1bid"

121

1bid. at 601-02. The idea was expanded in J.H. Grey, "Can Fairness Be Effective?"

(1982) 27 McGill LJ. 360. See also Grey, "The Ideology of Administrative Law", supra, note
1.
122

'rhe Duty," ibid. at 608.

12 3

Loughlin, supra, note 1 at 230.
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full embrace of its implications."124 However, it is not clear that the
courts in Canada have been as reticent as those theorists predicting
an informality crisis thought they would become. The strongest
evidence of judicial reticence to pursue the implications of informal
activism is the consistent and continuing refusal of Canadian courts
to review the procedures followed by bodies performing functions
categorized as legislative. This, however, is the only area that has
been hived off, and the courts have not been reticent to supervise
all other administrative functions.
2. Institutional limitations
A second criticism of the practice of fairness review is that
the courts lack the institutional competence to supervise, design, and
implement appropriate procedures for the wide range of government
activities that they supervise.
First, there is the problem of supervision. Commentators
point to the many factors involved in the transformation of disputes
into litigated cases before the courts.125 Judicial review is passive
and reactive. Someone must initiate proceedings to involve the
courts. People treated unfairly may not be aware of their
procedural rights, and, even if they are, they may not have -the
resources to seek and pursue a legal remedy. Because of this,
judicial intervention may be sporadic and random.
Second, the courts encounter substantial difficulties in
determining what constitutes a fair procedure in the circumstances.
As noted earlier, current law requires the court to look at many
factors to determine the requirements of fairness in a particular
context. Included are the seriousness of the interest being affected,
the benefits of added safeguards and the costs of those safeguards.
The court must decide what weight to give to different interests and
how to balance benefits and costs. Unless there are clearly
articulated criteria for making these decisions, the court must make

124IRA. Macdonald, "Judicial Review and Procedural Fairness in Administrative Law. II"
(1980) 26 McGill LJ. 1 at 21 [hereinafter "Judicial Review"].
125

The general problem of transforming disputes is discussed by W.L.F. Felstiner, R.L.

Abel & A. Sarat, 'The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming,
Claiming..." (1980-81) 15 Law & Soc. Rev. 631. The application of this analysis to procedural
fairness review is considered by J.F. Handler, The Conditions of Discretion: Autononty
Conmunio, Bureaucracy (New York. Russell Sage, 1986) at 22-32.
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a somewhat subjective and impressionistic judgment. This creates
problems of uncertainty and raises the question of why we should
vest the courts with the responsibility for making political judgments
of this sort,
especially in the absence of some consensus on a theory
1 26
of value.
Building on this insight, and on the work of Lon Fuller, Rod
Macdonald has argued against
judicial review of procedural fairness
127
on the following grounds:
1) Implying procedural formalities is an essentially legislative
rather than an adjudicative activity.
2) The litigational and remedial orientation of judicial review
makes it difficult to understand whether or how general
principles were applied to the particular context under
review.
3) Courts tend to assume that adversarial adjudication is the
paradigm against which procedural fairness is to be
measured.
In his view, the courts and the adversarial process are simply
inappropriate as an institution and as a method for designing fair
procedures. Instead, he sees the need to develop a new institutional
model of review, founded on the principle of consent and sensitive
to the characteristics of different social ordering mechanisms
appropriate to different contexts. Third, even if courts design
appropriate procedures, they may not be able to implement them.
For example, Michael Jackson1 28 recently documented the failure of
prison authorities to implement the decision in Re Howard and
PresidingOfficer of the Inmate DisciplinaryCourt of Stoney Mountain

126

These themes have been explored most fully in the United States. See J.L Mashaw,

'The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value," supra, note 1. Also see Loughlin,
supra, note 1 at 223-30 for similar observations with respect to the English experience.
127

See generally, L. Fuller, 'The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" (1978) 92 Harv. L.
Rev. 353; R.A. Macdonald, "Judicial Review", supra, note 143 and "A Theory of Procedural
Fairness" (1981) 1 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 3. The reasons are elaborated in "Judicial
Review", ibid. at 8-13.
1 28

M. Jackson, 'The Right to Counsel in Prison Disciplinary Hearings" (1986) 20 U.B.C.

L. Rev. 221 at 278-83.

602

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOi. 25 No. 3

Institution 29 There the court held that prisoners are, in some
circumstances, entitled to counsel in prison disciplinary hearings.
Finally, fairness jurisprudence and discourse focuses on
hearing rights, whether in a judicial, administrative, or even a
legislative context. At best, this imposes an obligation on the
decision maker to listen with a not altogether closed mind and to
respond, although a duty to give reasons is not firmly established in
Canadian administrative law.130
This limits the range of
participatory rights that one can realistically seek. It does not
include more popular or democratic forms of participation. For
example, there is virtually no possibility that a common law court
would imply a right of co-determination as a requirement of
procedural fairness or fundamental justice.
I do not think that many would disagree with the assertion
that some institutional limitations restrict the ability of courts to
effectively review and control procedural fairness in administrative
decision making. This does not, however, necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the courts are institutionally inappropriate or that
leaving the implied review function in their hands will generate
uncontrollable crisis tendencies in the state. There is no shortage
of commentators who reject the predictions of Loughlin and
Macdonald. David Mullan has been one of the most consistent
Canadian defenders of renewed, informal judicial review of
procedural fairness. He is aware of the difficulties that a balancing
test creates for the court, but he has faith in the ability of the
courts to handle the challenge. This faith is supported by his belief
that there is an underlying consensus on the goals and values in this
area of the legal system. According to Mullan, the principal value
of procedural fairness lies chiefly in its contribution to improving the
quality of decisions. Further, he believes the courts have the
capacity to design procedures which will achieve this goal. As long

-29(1985), 19 D.L.RI

(4th) 502 (F.CAD.).

130The restricted nature of the prohibition against bias is illustrated in ReEnergy Probe and

Atomic Energy ControlBoard (1984), 15 D.L.R. (4th) 48 (F.C.A.D.). For an overview of the
duty to give reasons, see H.L. Kushner, "The Right to Reasons in Administrative Law" (1986)

24 Alta. L. Rev. 305.
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do so, according to Mullan, legitimacy will be on their
as they
13 1
side.
In my view, the courts operate under severe institutional
limitations. I do not, however, think these limitations will lead the
practice of fairness review to some kind of crisis. One reason for
this is that there are other institutions involved in the creation of
procedural rights besides the courts. For example, the refusal of
courts to supervise procedural fairness in rulemaking has not
prevented rulemaking bodies from giving affected individuals and
groups substantial opportunities to participate in their proceedings.
Nor has it prevented the legislature from doing so expressly in
statutes. Also, even if the courts imposed a procedural framework
which threatened to impair the ability of the state to exercise
important regulatory or coercive functions, it is quite likely that the
state would find alternative means of performing those functions.
This is true even where the entitlement to procedural fairness
derives from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. For
example, to the extent that officials feel that the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Singh 3 2 contributed to the inability of
the state to control the flow of refugee claimants into Canada, it is
likely they will find other forms of restriction1 33 Further, it is
reasonable to assume that the more essential the state function
being interfered with, the more likely it is that procedural controls
will be circumvented.

131In addition to Mullan, supra, note 1, see "Procedural Fairness: Nicholson and the
Tasks Ahead" in Proceedingsof the Administrative Law Conference, 1979 (Vancouver: U.B.C.
Law Review, 1981) 219; "Natural Justice and Fairness - Substantive As Well As Procedural

Standards for the Review of Administrative Decision-Making?" (1982) 27 McGill LJ. 250; and
his review of administrative law decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in volumes 1-7 of
the Supreme Court Law Review.
32

1

Re Singh and Minister of Employment and Immigration (1985), 17 D.LR. (4th) 422

(S.C.C.).
133

These include limiting entry into Canada through the imposition of visa requirements

and limiting access to individual adjudication in certain circumstances. See Bill C-55, An Act
to amend the ImmigrationAct 1976 and to amend other Acts in consequence thereof, 2d Sess.,
33d Parl., 1986-87. Also see Bill C-84, An Act to amend the Immigration Ac4 1976 and the
Criminal Code in consequence thereof, 2d sess., 33d. parl., 1986-87.
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3. Judicial politics
A third way of criticizing the current practice of judicial
review of procedural fairness identifies the "politics of the
judiciary"13 4 and charts its impact on the distribution of procedural
rights between different classes and groups in society. The ambition
of this project is not just to challenge the courts because they are
necessarily political. Rather, it is to confront and to criticize the
politics of the court. Regrettably, administrative law scholars in
Canada have shied away from this kind of analysis. There may be
many reasons for this, but it is not because Canadian judges are
apolitical. There are certainly fairly clear indications that private
property rights holders are procedurally well protected by the courts,
as are police officers with respect to their jobs. However, in the
absence of more systematic examination of the case law, we can
only speculate as to the extent to which there is a fairly consistent
set of political values which determine the distribution of fairness.
As well, we need to know how participatory rights are distributed by
legislatures and administrative agencies, and how they are redistributed by the courts.
In sum, even if informalism in the law does not directly
detract from the ability of the courts to play an important and
positive role in the development of more procedurally fair
administrative decision-making processes, there are still strong
reasons for being skeptical about the likelihood that they will do so.
This is because of their limited institutional capacity and because of
the unsatisfactory political judgments they are likely to make.
Furthermore, legal discourse about procedural fairness and rights to
participate is extremely narrow and virtually excludes any
consideration of more direct forms of participatory democracy as
fundamental legal right.
B. ProceduralJustice in the Welfare State
So far in this section we have focused on the capacity of the
courts to design and implement fair procedures. However, even if

134See JAG..

Griffith, The Politicsof the Judiciary, 3d ed. (London: Fontana, 1985).
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courts, or some alternative institution, perform this function, there
still remains the question of the extent to which procedural
solutions can resolve or ameliorate the crisis tendencies which
undermined earlier bureaucratic models. Also, to what extent does
the achievement of procedural fairness create possibilities for less
powerful social groups to improve their position? To answer these
questions, it is necessary that we return to our analysis of the
political-economic context in which administrative fairness developed.
In other words, we want to apply a social theory of law to better
understand the possibilities and limits of the proceduralist solution.
In this regard, we might first consider a theoretical literature
which expresses great optimism in the ability of new legal
conceptions and institutions to overcome the limitations revealed in
the model of legal formalism. What is common in this literature is
the emphasis on the role of proceduralism and participation. One
version is the model of responsive law developed by Nonet and
Selznick. l35
In this model, law is primarily concerned with
enablement and facilitation rather than restriction of state power.
The role of law is to articulate principles of institutional design and
institutional diagnosis to find ways for the realization of general
purposes rather than the enforcement of specific rules. Because
responsive law concerns itself more with purpose than with rules,
legal obligation becomes more problematic. Majesty and precedent
are unable to uphold the legitimacy and authority of the law. As a
result, there is a blurring of the boundaries between law and
politics, and participation takes on a new significance. It provides
"a source of knowledge, a vehicle for communication and a
136
foundation for consent":
The special problem of postbureaucratic organization is to enlist participation, to
encourage initiative and responsibility, to create what Barnard called "cooperative

systems" capable of tapping the autonomous "contributions" of multiple constituents.
In purposive organization authority must be open and participatory. Consultation

135P. Nonet & P. Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (New
York: Harper and Row, 1978).
136

Ibid. at 100.
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is encouraged; reasons for decisions
are explained; criticism is welcome; consent is
13 7
taken as a test of rationality.

Building on the work of Nonet and Selznick, Teubner has
advocated/predicted the emergence of a new legal form that he
refers to as reflexive law.1 38 Teubner's work is of particular interest
not just because of its emphasis on proceduralism, but also because
he specifically sees reflexive law as a solution to the crisis
tendencies that Habermas identified in late capitalist social
formations.1 39 In this model, economic crisis tendencies were shifted
into the political system, but not resolved there. Rather, the shift
generated political crisis tendencies, including both rationality and
legitimation crises. This occurred because the state could not cope
with the complexity of socio-economic processes and because it was
beset by contradictory imperatives which prevented it from
performing economic steering functions. A legitimation crisis ensued
because the state could not fulfill the promises it made and because
of the erosion of traditional sources of legitimation. As a result,
procedural legitimation is one of the few options open: "Since
ultimate grounds can no longer be made plausible, the formal
140
conditions of justification themselves obtain legitimatingforce."
The purpose of reflexive law is "to create the structural
premises for a decentralized integration of society by supporting
integrative mechanisms within autonomous social subsystems." 141 It
does so through a procedural orientation which "only determines the
organizational and procedural premises of future action."142 In
other words, reflexive law is law that "puts in place autonomous and
self-legitimating constitutions for diverse domains, each having its

1371bid at 99 (fn. omitted).
138G. Teubner, "Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modem Law"' (1983) 17 Law &
Soc. Rev. 239.
139

1bid at 267-69. See generally, Habermas, supra, note 95.

140j. Habermas, cited in Teubner, ibid at 269.
! 41 Teubner, ibid at 255.
1421bid (fn. omitted).
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own distinctive principles and appropriate mechanisms, with the
framework providing for mutual respect among the
overall legal
143
spheres.
Rod Macdonald also proposed a model of administrative law
that is premised on a similar optimism about the possibilities of
renewed proceduralism. As we saw earlier, he rejected the courts
and adjudication as the institution and process for conducting
Nevertheless, Macdonald strongly
implied procedural review.
It was, in his view, a means
review.
fairness
procedural
favoured
of addressing institutional behaviour and rationality, of integrating
activity in one sphere into a larger institutional context, and of
guaranteeing effective participation by individuals and groups
affected by administrative action 4 4 Because a complex society
needs a variety of social ordering processes, it is essential that
people with an understanding of the uses, limits, and purposes of
these various processes perform this review. Although Macdonald
did not develop a theory of administrative legitimacy, he ultimately
grounded the entire structure on a theory of consent. In order for
a social ordering process to be legitimate, it must be consented to
by all parties. To resolve a disagreement over the appropriate
procedural paradigm, Macdonald advocated the use of a mediational
process rather than a political one. This was because of the
consensual basis of mediation.1 45 In the event that mediation failed,
however, Macdonald was caught in a conundrum.
In many ways, Macdonald's model of law is closely akin to
the model of reflexive law described by Teubner. They both saw
the function of law as that of regulating and coordinating social
ordering processes. Further, they both believed that in society there
are a wide range of semi-autonomous spheres, each of which has its
own distinct functions and characteristics. Also, these attempts to
find proceduralist solutions to the crisis of law and legitimacy in the
welfare state share a number of common assumptions. The most

143

D. Kettler, "Legal Reconstitution of the Welfare State: A Latent Social Democratic

Legacy' (1987) 21 Law & Soc. Rev. 9 at 36.
144

R. Macdonald, "Judicial Review," supra, note 143 at 5-8.

145 See "ATheory of Procedural Fairness," supra, note 146.
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consensus, or at least the possibility of constructing one
procedurally. Thus, for example, at the close of their discussion of
responsive law, Nonet and Selznick write: "Responsive law presupposes a society that has the political capacity to face its
problems, establish its priorities, and make the necessary
commitments. For responsive law is no maker of miracle in the
realm of justice. Its achievements depend on the will and resources
of the political community."146
Also, at least for the more progressive, there is an
assumption that society has reached a certain level of
democratization and equalization of power.
That is, there is a
belief that people can participate on a roughly equal basis. Again,
Nonet and Selznick express this aspiration most clearly:
One effect of legal pluralism is to multiply opportunities within the legal process
for participation in the making of law. In this way the legal arena becomes a
special kind of political forum and legal participation takes on a political dimension.

In other words, legal action comes to serve as a vehicle by which some
14 7 groups and
organizations may participate in the determination of public policy.

A universal assessment of the potential of enhanced
procedural fairness or participation, to improve the efficacy of
administration while simultaneously legitimizing and democratizing
the administrative process, is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, it would be useful to examine the empirical basis for the
level of optimism that these authors share.
The most important deficiency in the preceding analyses is
the failure to appreciate the structural determinants of the crisis of
the welfare state, and the impact of these determinants on the
viability of procedural solutions. In particular, there is a distinct
tendency to underplay the conflict which initially led to the
expansion of the role of the state, and has since made the state
itself, including its administrative branch, into a terrain of conflict.
To the extent that the state faces contradictory demands, there is
little reason to believe that more and better participation will lead
to a resolution of that conflict. A more participatory process may

14 6

Supra, note 154 at 113 (fn. omitted).

147

Ibid at 96 (fn. omitted).
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achieve some measure of increased legitimacy, but often will not
satisfactorily resolve substantive disagreements. Losers in these
disputes may find small consolation in the fact that they have been
heard, especially if they are consistent losers.
Not only does this analysis underemphasize the existence of
conflict or contradiction, it also underemphasizes the unequal
distribution of power between social classes and its impact in the
administrative process. This inequality manifests itself in a variety
of ways. First, participation is often expensive and in the absence
of external funding, many will be unable to afford to participate
effectively. This is the most direct and immediate effect of
inequality. It is also the one about which reformers have done the
most by providing legal aid and other forms of intervenor funding.
However, even if creative funding mechanisms are found to offset
the direct impact of economic inequality, there still remain more
subtle, but equally important effects of inequality. Both Marxists
and non-Marxists have recognized that the state is constrained by
the investment decisions of capitalists. First, the state itself is
dependent on its ability to raise revenue through taxation, and
therefore depends on a healthy economy, which in turn is
dependent on private investment. Second, the electorate judges
governments, at least in part, on the performance of the economy.
The level of private investment has a substantial impact on the
economy and the economic well-being of the population. Thus the
pressure to maintain a high level of "business confidence" is a
continuous and pervasive influence on the formation of state
policy.148 In the words of Lindblom: "In the eyes of government
officials, therefore, businessmen do not appear simply as the
representatives of a special interest, as representatives of interest
groups do. They appear as functionaries performing
functions that
49
government officials regard as indispensable."'
Ontario's designated substance regulation process provides a
good example of the significant impact that conflict and inequality
have on a participatory model of bureaucracy. The Occupational
148For a Marxist version of this theme, see Offe, supra, note 99 at 119-29. For a nonMarxist version see Lindblom, infra, note 168, c. 13.
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Health and Safety Act requires the Minister of Labour to give notice
that a substance may be designated and to call for submissions in
that regard. 50° In practice, the Ministry gives even greater rights of
participation in the designated substance process than those
prescribed by statute 51 Yet despite the apparent openness of this
process, the Ontario Federation of Labour decided to boycott it in
1984. This was a result of its1negative
experiences with that process
52
in its first years of operation.
First, it was clear there were substantive disagreements
between labour and capital over priorities in standard setting and in
the content of the standards. For example, labour favoured stricter
exposure limits than those favoured by capital. Also, labour wanted
the Ministry to regulate on the assumption that all substances and
physical agents are harmful unless proven safe. Capital did not want
the government to act unless there was scientific evidence to
establish the presence of a hazard. The opportunity to participate
in the formation of policy did not lead to a narrowing of differences
between labour and capital. Instead, it constituted the administrative
process as a new terrain of conflict.
Conflict by itself, however, did not cause labour to boycott
the administrative process. Rather, labour did not feel that it was
effectively participating. As I have argued elsewhere, the Ministry
selected standards which deemed acceptable exposure levels that
workers were currently experiencing in major organized industries.
In effect, organized workers were doing no better in the regulatory
process than they had done in the capitalist labour market.153 In
part, labour attributed this result to the effects of inequality
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manifested in the designated substance process. Employers had
better access to information and greater financial and manpower
resources to devote to each step in the process.
To remedy this inequality, organized labour recommended
the establishment of a publicly funded, permanent labourmanagement standards committee. In effect, it sought a form of
worker co-determination. While this would be a step in the right
direction, it still does not come to grips with the structural basis of
inequality and its likely impact on such a standard setting process.
Labour in this country lacks the organizational and political power
to offset the power of private capital. Formal equality and equality
of resources within the administrative process will not significantly
offset the substantive economic and political inequality between
labour and capital in the social formation. This is the reality which
must be confronted in any realistic assessment of the possibilities of
participatory solutions to resolve the problems confronting the
capitalist state.
Obviously, a single example does not demolish or prove a
thesis. However, even the supporters of proceduralism recognize its
limits. For instance, Teubner has conceded that consumer law
provides a shaky example of the potential for reflexive law: "This
strategy necessarily fails if social asymmetries of power and
15 4
information can resist institutional attempts at equalization."
The point of this argument is not to suggest that the
capitalist state will never act against the interests of capital and that,
therefore, the development of more open processes of administrative
decision making has no significance. Rather, I want to draw
attention to the salience of conflict and unequal power relations to
any understanding of the growth and development of the state and
the institutional arrangements for the exercise of state power. In
social democratic countries where past struggles have resulted in the
creation of a stronger working class movement, or where social
movements exercise greater power, procedural approaches may
indeed result in both more efficacious and more democratized
decision making. They can exercise their greater social and political
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power to create procedural opportunities located higher up on "the
ladder of citizen participation." Instead of being limited to
manipulation, consultation, and placation, they are more likely to
achieve partnership, delegated power, and control.1 55 In social
formations that are more liberal than social democratic, such as
Canada and the United States, the mal-distribution of wealth and
power renders problematic any strategy that focuses on
proceduralism either as a form of legitimation or as a strategy for
empowerment. The failure to recognize this leads to unduly
optimistic predictions about the benefits of proceduralism by both
liberals, who are seeking to reconstitute legality in the welfare state,
and by radicals, who are seeking for struggle1 56
V CONCLUSION
Our preliminary inquiry into the development of procedural
fairness, both as a requirement imposed by the courts and as a
model of bureaucratic operations, should not lead us to despair that
once again the state and the courts have devised a cunning strategy
to divert challenges from progressive movements into dead ends
where their energies will be dissipated and their efforts be defeated.
It is unfair to overemphasize the limits of increased participation
without recognizing its possibilities. Past struggles have succeeded
in partially politicizing the processes of accumulation and
legitimation in the capitalist social order. The capitalist state has
developed its administrative capacities, but has been unable to
contain conflicts that arise. One of the concessions it has made,
sometimes legislatively, sometimes administratively, and sometimes at
the insistence of the courts, is to allow greater public participation
in its administrative processes. This has created greater potential
for democratic control and the disruption of the state's role in
'55S. Amstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation" (July, 1969) Journal of American
Institute of Planners 216 at 217.
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reproducing capitalist social relations. On the whole, however,
participatory rights are not empowering. They do not create direct,
popular controls over the administrative apparatus of the state and
they do not offset the unequal distribution of social power.
Nevertheless, they do provide a foothold and a new baseline from
which to make further claims.
The pursuit of procedural fairness as a transformative
strategy, however, does need careful consideration. There are risks
as well as benefits. For example, the extension of procedural and
participatory rights benefits corporations who are resisting state
regulation. Indeed, they may benefit disproportionately from the
extension of procedural rights as they have the resources to exercise
these rights fully. As well, the channelling of disputes into legal or
administrative forums may lead to a reduction of participatory
democracy. Instead of mass participation in strikes, referendums,
demonstrations, and other similar activities, representatives (who are
frequently lawyers) call evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and make
submissions, usually respectfully.
Finally, the developments we have examined support the
view that law is articulated with the social formation and is not as
contingent as many have supposed. In the field of administrative
law, and in particular in those areas of regulation which involve
inter-class conflict, it is particularly useful to explore the
relationships between the crisis tendencies that have driven the
expansion of the capitalist state, the institutional forms this has
taken, and the development of the legal framework for the exercise
of delegated power. Further, because the choice of transformative
strategies requires careful consideration of power relations and the
institutional apparatuses through which they are mediated, it is
crucial that critical legal theorists also develop a critical social
theory.

